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We consider a model of liquidity demand arising from a possible maturity mismatch between asset
revenues and consumption. This liquidity demand can be met with either cash reserves (inside liquidity)
or via asset sales for cash (outside liquidity). The question we address is, what determines the mix
of inside and outside liquidity in equilibrium? An important source of inefficiency in our model is
the presence of asymmetric information about asset values, which increases the longer a liquidity trade
is delayed. We establish existence of an immediate-trading equilibrium, in which asset trading occurs
in anticipation of a liquidity shock, and sometimes also of a delayed-trading equilibrium, in which
assets are traded in response to a liquidity shock. We show that, when it exists, the delayed-trading
equilibrium is Pareto superior to the immediate-trading equilibrium, despite the presence of adverse
selection. However, the presence of adverse selection may inefficiently accelerate asset liquidation.
We also show that the delayed-trading equilibrium features more outside liquidity than the immediate-trading
equilibrium although it is supplied in the presence of adverse selection. Finally, long term contracts
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The main goal of this paper is to propose a tractable model of maturity transformation
by ¯nancial intermediaries and liquidity demand arising from the maturity mismatch between
asset payo®s and desired redemptions. When ¯nancial intermediaries invest in long-term assets
they may face redemptions before these assets mature. They therefore have a need for liquidity.
Early redemptions can be met either with cash reserves { what we refer to as inside liquidity
{ or with the proceeds from asset sales to other investors with a longer horizon{what we refer
to as outside liquidity. In reality ¯nancial intermediaries rely on both forms of liquidity and
the purpose of our analysis is to determine the relative importance and e±ciency of inside and
outside liquidity in a competitive equilibrium of the ¯nancial sector.
Our model comprises two di®erent groups of agents that di®er in their investment hori-
zons. One class of agents is short-run investors (SRs) who prefer early asset payo®s, and the
second class is long-run investors (LRs) who are indi®erent to the timing of asset payo®s. One
can think of the long-run investors as wealthy individuals, endowments, hedge funds, pension
funds or even sovereign wealth funds, and of the short-run investors as ¯nancial intermediaries,
banks or mutual funds, catering to small investors with shorter investment horizons. Within
this model the key question is, what determines the mix of inside and outside liquidity in
equilibrium?
Our model describes a situation in which SRs invest in risky projects besides holding
cash, and where LRs have su±cient knowledge about these projects to stand ready to buy
them at a relatively good price.1 An important potential source of ine±ciency in reality and
in our model is asymmetric information between SRs and LRs about project quality. That
is, even when SRs turn to knowledgeable LRs to sell claims to their assets, the latter cannot
always tell whether the sale is due to a sudden liquidity need or whether the SR investor
is trying to pass on a lemon. This problem is familiar to market participants and has been
widely studied in the literature in di®erent contexts. The novel aspect our model focuses on is
a timing dimension. SRs tend to learn more about their liquidity needs and underlying asset
values over time. Therefore, when at the onset of a liquidity shock they choose to hold on to
their positions { in the hope of riding out a temporary crisis { they run the risk of having to go
to the market in a much worse position should the crisis be a prolonged one. The longer they
wait the worse is the lemons problem and therefore the greater is the risk that they will have
to sell assets at ¯re-sale prices. Yet, it makes sense for SRs not to rush to sell their projects, as
1Other less knowledgeable investors who are only ready to buy these assets at a much higher discount are
not explicitly modeled.
1these may mature and pay o® soon enough so that SRs may ultimately not face any liquidity
shortage. This timing decision by SRs as to when to sell their assets for cash creates the main
tension in our model.
This timing of liquidity trades is the source of a common dynamic in liquidity crises,
where the crisis deepens over time as asset prices decline. This aspect of liquidity crises has
not been much analyzed nor previously modeled. We capture the essence of the unfolding of
a liquidity crisis by establishing the existence of two types of rational expectations equilibria:
an immediate-trading equilibrium, where SRs are rationally expected to trade at the onset
of the liquidity shock, and a delayed-trading equilibrium, where they are instead expected to
prefer attempting to ride out the crisis and to only trade as a last resort should the crisis
be a prolonged one. We show that for some parameter values only the immediate-trading
equilibrium exists, while for other values both equilibria coexist.
When two di®erent rational expectations equilibria can coexist one naturally wonders
how they compare in terms of e±ciency. Which is better? Interestingly, the answer to this
question depends critically on the ex-ante portfolio-composition decisions of both SR and LR
investors. In a nutshell, under the expectation of immediate liquidity-trading, LRs expect to
obtain the assets originated by SRs at close to fair value. In this case the returns of holding
outside liquidity are low and thus there is little cash held by LRs. On the other side of the
liquidity trade, SRs will then expect to be able to sell a relatively small fraction of assets
at close to fair value, and therefore respond by relying more heavily on inside liquidity. In
other words, in an immediate-trading equilibrium there is less cash-in-the-market pricing (to
borrow a term from Allen and Gale, 1998) and therefore a lower supply of outside liquidity.
The anticipated reduced supply of outside liquidity causes SRs to rely more on inside liquidity
and, thus, bootstraps the relatively high equilibrium price for the assets held by SRs under
immediate liquidity trading.
In contrast, under the expectation of delayed liquidity trading, SRs rely more on outside
liquidity. Here the bootstrap works in the other direction, as LRs decide to hold more cash in
anticipation of a larger future supply of the assets held by SRs. These assets will be traded at
lower cash-in-the-market prices in the delayed-trading equilibrium, even taking into account
the worse lemons problem under delayed trading. The reason is that in this equilibrium SRs
originate more projects and therefore end up trading more assets following a liquidity shock.
They originate more projects in this delayed trading equilibrium because the expected return
for SRs to investing in a project is higher in the delayed-trading equilibrium, due to the lower
overall probability of liquidating assets before they mature.
2In sum, immediate trading equilibria are based on a greater reliance on inside liquidity
than delayed-trading equilibria. And, to the extent that there is a greater reliance on outside
liquidity in a delayed-trading equilibrium, one should expect { and we indeed establish { that
equilibrium asset prices are lower in the delayed-trading than in the immediate-trading equi-
librium. In other words, our model predicts the typical pattern of liquidity crises, where asset
prices progressively deteriorate throughout the crisis. Importantly, this predictable pattern in
asset prices is still consistent with no arbitrage, as short-run investors prefer to delay asset
sales, despite the deterioration in asset prices, in the hope that they wont have to trade at all
at these ¯re sale prices.2
Because of this deterioration in asset prices one would expect that welfare is also worse
in the delayed-trading equilibrium. However, the Pareto superior equilibrium is in fact the
delayed-trading equilibrium. What is the economic logic behind this somewhat surprising
result? The answer is that the fundamental gains from trade in our model are between SRs
who undervalue long term assets, and LRs who undervalue cash. Thus, the more SRs can be
induced to originate projects and the more LRs can be induced to hold cash, the higher are
the gains from trade and therefore the higher is welfare. In other words, the welfare e±cient
form of liquidity in our model is outside liquidity. Since the delayed-trading equilibrium relies
more on outside liquidity it is more e±cient.
In the presence of asymmetric information, however, outside liquidity involves a dilution
of ownership cost so that SRs prefer to partially rely on ine±cient inside liquidity. As the
lemons' problem worsens { in particular, as SRs are less likely to trade for liquidity reasons
when they engage in delayed-trading { the cost of outside liquidity rises. There is then a
point when the cost is so high that SRs are better o® postponing the redemption of their
investments altogether, rather than realize a very low ¯re-sale price for their valuable projects.
At that point the delayed-trading equilibrium collapses, as only lemons would get traded for
early redemption.
In this paper we do not take an optimal mechanism design approach. We attempt
instead to specify a model of trading opportunities that mimics the main characteristics of
actual markets. The main advantage of our approach is that it facilitates interpretation and
considerably simpli¯es aspects of the model that are not central to the questions we focus
on. Still, we consider one contracting alternative to markets, in which SRs write a long-term
contract for liquidity with LRs. Such a contract takes the form of an investment fund set up
2SRs' decision to delay trading has all the hallmarks of gambling for resurrection. But it is in fact unrelated
to the idea of excess risk taking as SRs will choose to delay whether or not they are levered.
3by LRs, in which the initial endowments of one SR and one LR are pooled, and where the
fund promises state-contingent payments to its investors. Under complete information such a
fund arrangement would always dominate any equilibrium allocation achieved through future
spot trading of assets for cash. However, when the investor who manages the fund also has
private information about the realized returns on the fund's investments then, as we show, the
long-term contract cannot always achieve a more e±cient outcome than the delayed-trading
equilibrium. Indeed, the fund manager's private information then constraints the fund to make
only incentive compatible state-contingent transfers to the SR investor, thus raising the cost
of providing liquidity. We show that the fund allocation is dominated by the delayed-trading
equilibrium in parameter regions for which there is a high level of origination and distribution
of risky assets.
Given that neither ¯nancial markets nor long-term contracts for liquidity can achieve a
fully e±cient outcome, the question naturally arises whether some form of public intervention
may provide an e±ciency improvement. There are two market ine±ciencies that public policy
might mitigate. An ex-post ine±ciency, which arises when the delayed-trading equilibrium
fails to exist, and an ex-ante ine±ciency in the form of an excess reliance on inside liquidity.
It is worth noting that a common prescription against banking liquidity crises{to require that
banks hold cash reserves or excess equity capital{would be counterproductive in our model.
Such a requirement would only force SRs to rely more on ine±cient inside liquidity and would
undermine the supply of outside liquidity.
We discuss policy interventions in greater depth in Bolton, Santos and Scheinkman
(2009), where we point out that the best form of public liquidity intervention relies on a
complementarity between public and outside liquidity. Public liquidity in the form of a price
support can restore existence of the delayed-trading equilibrium and thereby induce LRs to
hold more outside liquidity. That is, such a policy would induce long-term investors to hold
more cash in the knowledge that SRs rely less on inside liquidity, and thus help increase
the availability of outside liquidity. Thus, far from being a substitute for privately provided
liquidity, a commitment to providing price support in secondary asset markets in liquidity
crises could be a complement and give rise to positive spillover e®ects on the provision of
outside liquidity.
4Related literature. Our paper is related to the literatures on banking and liquidity crises,
and the limits of arbitrage. Our analysis di®ers from the main contributions in these litera-
tures mainly in two respects: ¯rst, our focus on ex-ante e±ciency and equilibrium portfolio
composition, and second, the endogenous timing of liquidity trading. Still, our analysis shares
several important themes and ideas with these literatures. We brie°y discuss the most related
contributions in each of these literatures.
Consider ¯rst the banking literature. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Bryant (1980)
provide the ¯rst models of investor liquidity demand, maturity transformation, and inside
liquidity. In their model a bank run may occur if there is insu±cient inside liquidity to meet
depositor withdrawals. In contrast to our model, investors are identical ex-ante, and are risk-
averse with respect to future liquidity shocks. The role of ¯nancial intermediaries is to provide
insurance against idiosyncratic investors' liquidity shocks.
Bhattacharya and Gale (1986) provide the ¯rst model of both inside and outside liquidity
by extending the Diamond and Dybvig framework to allow for multiple banks, which may
face di®erent liquidity shocks. In their framework, an individual bank may meet depositor
withdrawals with either inside liquidity or outside liquidity by selling claims to long-term assets
to other banks who may have excess cash reserves. An important insight of their analysis is
that individual banks may free-ride on other banks' liquidity supply and choose to hold too
little liquidity in equilibrium.
More recently, Allen and Gale (2000) and Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet (2000) (see also
Aghion, Bolton and Dewatripont, 2000) have analyzed models of liquidity provided through
the interbank market, which can give rise to contagious liquidity crises. The main mechanism
they highlight is the default on an interbank loan which depresses secondary-market prices
and pushes other banks into a liquidity crisis. Subsequently, Acharya (2001) and Acharya and
Yorulmazer (2005) have, in turn, introduced optimal bailout policies in a model with multiple
banks and cash-in-the-market pricing of loans in the interbank market.
While Diamond and Dybvig considered idiosyncratic liquidity shocks and the risk of
panic runs that may arise as a result of banks' attempts to insure depositors against these
shocks, Allen and Gale (1998) consider aggregate business-cycle shocks and point to the need
for equilibrium banking crises to achieve optimal risk-sharing between depositors. In their
model aggregate shocks may trigger the need for asset sales, but their analysis does not allow
for the provision of both inside and outside liquidity.
Another strand of the banking literature, following Holmstrom and Tirole (1998 and
2008) considers liquidity demand on the corporate borrowers' side rather than on depositors'
5side, and asks how e±ciently this liquidity demand can be met through bank lines of credit.
This literature emphasizes the need for public liquidity to supplement private liquidity in case
of aggregate demand shocks.
Most closely related to our model is the framework considered in Fecht (2004), which
itself builds on the related models of Diamond (1997) and Allen and Gale (2000). The models of
Diamond (1997) and Fecht (2004) seek to address an important weakness of the Diamond and
Dybvig theory, which cannot account for the observed coexistence of ¯nancial intermediaries
and securities markets. Liquidity trading in secondary markets undermines liquidity provision
by banks and obviates the need for any ¯nancial intermediation in the Diamond and Dybvig
setting, as Jacklin (1987) has shown. To address this objection, Diamond (1997) introduces
a model where banks coexist with securities markets due to the fact that households face
costs in switching out of the banking sector and into securities markets. Fecht (2004) extends
Diamond (1997) by introducing segmentation on the asset side between ¯nancial intermediaries'
investments in ¯rms and claims issued directly by ¯rms to investors though securities markets.
Also, in his model banks have local (informational) monopoly power on the asset side, and
subsequently can trade their assets in securities markets for cash{a form of outside liquidity.
Finally, Fecht (2004) also allows for a contagion mechanism similar to Allen and Gale (2000)
and Diamond and Rajan (2005),3 whereby a liquidity shock at one bank propagates itself
through the ¯nancial system by depressing asset prices in securities markets.
Two other closely related models are Gorton and Huang (2004) and Parlour and Plantin
(2007). Gorton and Huang also consider liquidity supplied in a general equilibrium model and
also argue that publicly provided liquidity can be welfare enhancing if the private supply of
liquidity involves a high opportunity cost. However, in contrast to our analysis they do not look
at the optimal composition of inside and outside liquidity, nor do they consider the dynamics
of liquidity trading. Parlour and Plantin (2007) consider a model where banks may securitize
loans, and thus obtain access to outside liquidity. As in our setting, the e±ciency of outside
liquidity is a®ected by adverse selection. But in the equilibrium they characterize liquidity
may be excessive for some banks{as it undermines their loan origination standards{and too
low for other banks, who may be perceived as holding excessively risky assets.
The second literature our model is related to is the literature on liquidity and the dy-
namics of arbitrage by capital or margin-constrained speculators in the line of Dow and Gorton
(1993) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997). The typical model in this literature (e.g. Kyle and
3Another feature in Diamond and Rajan (2005) in common with our setup is the idea that ¯nancial inter-
mediaries possess superior information about their assets, which is another source of illiquidity.
6Xiong, 2001 and Xiong, 2001) also allows for outside liquidity and generates episodes of ¯re-sale
pricing{even destabilizing price dynamics{following negative shocks that tighten speculators'
margin constraints. However, most models in this literature do not address the issue of deterio-
rating adverse selection and the timing of liquidity trading, nor do they explore the question of
the optimal mix between inside and outside liquidity. The most closely related articles, besides
Kyle and Xiong (2001) and Xiong (2001) are Gromb and Vayanos (2002), Brunnermeier and
Pedersen (2007) and Kondor (2007). In particular, Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2007) also




There are two types of agents, short and long-run investors with preferences over periods
t = 1;2;3. Short run investors (SRs), of which there is a unit mass, have preferences
u(C1;C2;C3) = C1 + C2 + ±C3; (1)
where Ct ¸ 0 denotes consumption at dates t = 1;2;3 and ± 2 (0;1). These investors have
one unit of endowment at date 0 and no endowments at subsequent dates. There is also a unit
mass of long run investors (LRs), each with · > 0 units of endowment at t = 0 and again no




with Ct ¸ 0:
II.B Assets
For simplicity and with almost no loss of generality we assume that the two types of
investors have access to di®erent investment opportunity sets. Both types can hold cash with
a gross per-period rate of return of one. LR investors can also invest in a decreasing-returns-
to-scale long-maturity asset that returns '(x) at date 3 for an initial investment at date 0 of
x = (· ¡ M), where M ¸ 0 is the LRs' cash holding to which we refer as outside liquidity.
Because LRs are risk neutral the assumption that the long run project is riskless is without loss
of generality and nothing would change if we assumed that output from the long run project
was random.
7SR investors can invest up to one unit in a risky project (asset), which is a constant
returns to scale technology, that returns e ½t at dates t = 1;2;3 where e ½t 2 f0;½g and ½ > 1,
per-unit invested. The return on the risky asset is the only source of uncertainty in the model
and is shown in Figure 1. We assume that there is a ¯rst aggregate maturity shock that a®ects
all risky assets. That is, agents learn ¯rst whether all risky assets mature at date 1, or at some
later date. Subsequently, the realized value of a risky asset and whether it matures at date 2
or 3 is determined by an idiosyncratic shock.4
Formally, the SR chooses a size º · 1 for the risky project and the project either pays
½º at date 1 (in state !1½), which occurs with probability ¸, or it pays at a subsequent date,
with probability (1 ¡ ¸). In that case the asset yields either a return e ½2 2 f0;½g at date 2,
or a late return e ½3 2 f0;½g at date 3 per unit invested. After date 1 shocks are idiosyncratic
(i.e. independent across SRs) and are represented by two independent random variables: (i) an
individual asset can either mature at date 2, with probability µ, or at date 3 with probability
(1 ¡ µ) (in idiosyncratic state !2L); (ii) when the asset matures at either dates t = 2;3 it
returns e ½t = ½ with probability ´ (in idiosyncratic states !2½ and !3½, respectively) and e ½t = 0
with probability (1 ¡ ´) for t = 2;3 (in idiosyncratic states !20 and !30.) The realization of
idiosyncratic shocks is private information to the SR holding the risky asset.5 We denote by
m the amount of cash held by SRs and by º = 1 ¡ m the amount invested in the risky asset;
m is thus our measure of inside liquidity.
Finally, in this model we ignore the presence of other agents for whom acquiring both
the long run and the risky assets would only be attractive at much lower prices.6
II.C Assumptions
We introduce assumptions on payo®s that focus the analysis on the economically inter-
esting outcomes and thus considerably shorten the discussion of the model. We begin with
4We assume that the shock in period 1 is aggregate to simplify the analysis and to focus on the informational
failure induced by the idiosyncratic shock in period 2.
5The assumption that adverse selection problems worsen during a liquidity crisis is consistent with the current
episode. The risk pro¯le of many ¯nancial intermediaries became di±cult to ascertain as the residential real
estate and mortgage markets' implosion unfolded in 2007 and 2008 (see Gorton 2007 and 2008). The freezing
up of the interbank loan market was just one symptom of the di±culty in assessing the direct and indirect
exposure of ¯nancial institutions to these toxic assets.
6We are currently exploring a model where the amount of capital available to absorb resales (· in the current
paper) is determined in equilibrium.
8assumptions on the long run asset.
'0 (·) > 1 with '00 (x) < 0 and lim
x¡!0
'0(x) = +1 (A1)
The assumption that '00 (¢) < 0 captures the fact that the opportunities that these long assets
represent are scarce and cannot be exploited without limit. We also assume that LRs always
want to invest some fraction of their endowment in this long asset, limx!0 '0 (x) = +1. The
key assumption here though is that '0(·) > 1. This implies that if LRs carry cash it must be
to acquire assets with expected returns at least as high as '0(·). Given our assumption of risk
neutrality this can only occur if asset purchases occur at cash-in-the-market prices. That is,
assets must trade in equilibrium at prices that are below their expected payo®, for otherwise
LRs would have no incentive to carry cash.
Our second assumption says that SRs would not invest in the risky asset in autarchy,
even though investment in the risky asset may be more attractive than holding cash when the
asset can be resold at a reasonable price:
½[¸ + (1 ¡ ¸)´] > 1 and ¸½ + (1 ¡ ¸)[µ + (1 ¡ µ)±]´½ < 1 (A2)
Assumption A2 is needed to capture the economically interesting situation where liquid-
ity of secondary markets at dates 1 and 2 a®ects asset allocation decisions at date 0. If instead
we assumed that
¸½ + (1 ¡ ¸)[µ + (1 ¡ µ)±]´½ ¸ 1
then SRs would always choose to put all their funds in a risky asset irrespective of the liquidity
of the secondary market at date 1.
Finally we assume that there are gains from trade at least at date 1. That is, '0 (·) is
not as high as to rule out the possibility that LRs carry cash to trade at date 1. As will become
clear below, assumption A3 implies that the agents' isopro¯t lines cross in the right way:







Given that all SRs are ex-ante identical, we shall restrict attention to competitive equi-
libria that treat all SRs symmetrically. We also restrict attention to pooling equilibria, in which
observable actions cannot be used to distinguish among SRs.We will also assume that each LR
gets exactly the same (expected) pro¯t in equilibrium. Recall that trade between SRs and LRs
9can only take place in spot markets at dates 1 and 2, and that in period 1 there are strictly
positive gains from trade only if aggregate state !1L obtains. We write P1 for the price of one
unit of risky project in period 1 if state !1L obtains, and P2 for the price of one unit of the risky
project in period 2. Given that SRs have private information about realized returns on their
risky asset at date 2, they can condition their trading policy on their idiosyncratic state !2¢.
LRs, on the other hand, are unable to distinguish among potential SR sellers in any pooling
equilibrium. We denote by q1 the amount of the risky asset supplied by an SR at date 1 (in
state !1L) and by q2 the amount supplied at date 2; by an SR who is in the (idiosyncratic)
state !2L: Notice that an SR who is in the (idiosyncratic) state !20 would always sell all his
risky assets at any price, since he is sure that the project will not yield any payo®, whereas a
SR investor in state !2½ might, as well, simply consume its output. Similarly, we denote by
Q1 and Q2 the amount of the risky asset that an LR investor acquires at t = 1 and t = 2,
respectively.7 Finally each LR investor that chooses M units of cash has claims to '(· ¡ M)
units of output in period 3 that, in principle, he can choose to sell to others in period 1 or 2.
The risk neutrality of the LRs links the price of output at each point to the expected return
on other assets held by the LRs.
Although it is not important, it will facilitate the interpretation of our results, as well as
the discussion of the long term contract below, to assume that SRs have to sell their entire risky
investment whenever they sell any. The interpretation of this assumption is that once a scale is
chosen, a risky project is indivisible. This indivisibility is consistent with our assumption that
each risky project has at most one SR owner, who is the only agent that observes the state of
the risky project in period 2. To simplify the proof that follows, we will provisionally assume
that LRs can share ownership of risky projects among themselves. Since, in equilibrium, LRs
will hold to maturity any risky projects they eventually acquire and are risk-neutral, this
possibility of sharing risky project has no informational impact. In addition, we will show
below that making an analogous assumption concerning the LRs, namely that LRs can either
buy a single risky project or none at all would not change much in our equilibrium analysis.
III.A The SR optimization problem
SRs must determine ¯rst how much to invest in cash and how much in a risky asset.
Second, they must decide how much of the risky asset to trade at date 1 at price P1 and at
7More formally, we could have written P1 (!1L) and P2 (!1L) to denote the prices of the risky asset at dates
1 and 2 and similarly Q1 (!1L) and Q2 (!1L) to denote the quantities acquired by LRs at di®erent dates. Given
that all trading occurs in the \lower branch" of the tree we adopt the simpler notation as there is no possible
ambiguity.
10date 2 at price P2. Their objective function is then
¼ [m;q1;q2] = m + ¸(1 ¡ m)½
+ (1 ¡ ¸)q1P1
+ (1 ¡ ¸)µ´ [(1 ¡ m) ¡ q1]½ (2)
+ (1 ¡ ¸)µ(1 ¡ ´)[1 ¡ m ¡ q1]P2
+ (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ µ)q2P2
+ ± (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ µ)´ [(1 ¡ m) ¡ q1 ¡ q2]½
As already mentioned, notice that implicit in this objective function is the fact that an
SR in (idiosyncratic) state !20 liquidates his remaining position in the risky asset in its entirety
since he is sure they are worthless. In addition, in states where the asset yields ½ we assume
that the SRs consume the payo®s, since market prices can never exceed ½: Finally we do not
consider the possibility that an SR investor would acquire claims to output in period 3 from
LRs, since SRs value such claims strictly less than the LRs.







q1 + q2 · 1 ¡ m and q1;q2 2 f0;1 ¡ mg
The constraints simply state that the SR cannot invest more in the risky asset than
the funds at its disposal and that it cannot sell more than what it holds. The last condition
guarantees that when an SR sells his risky assets, he must sell everything he owns.
III.B The LR optimization problem
LR investors must ¯rst determine how much of their savings to hold in cash (outside
liquidity), M, and how much in long term assets, ·¡M. LRs must also decide at dates 1 and
2 how much of the risky assets to purchase at prices P1 and P2. Recall that, given assumption
A1 cash is costly to carry for LRs and thus they never carry cash that they will never use. In
other words, in some state of nature where trade occurs LR investors must completely exhaust
their cash reserves to purchase the available supply of SR risky assets. With this observation
11in mind we can write the payo® an LR investor that purchases Q1 at date 1 and Q2 at date 2,
as follows:
¦[M;Q1;Q2] = M + '(· ¡ M)
+ (1 ¡ ¸)[´½ ¡ P1]Q1 (3)
+ (1 ¡ ¸)E [~ ½3 ¡ P2jF]Q2
The ¯rst line in (3) is simply what the LR investor gets by holding an amount of cash M
until date 3 without ever trading in secondary markets at dates 1 and 2. The third term is
the net return from acquiring a position Q1 in risky assets at unit price P1 at date 1. Indeed,
the expected gross return of a risky asset in state !1L is ´½. The last term is the net return
from trading in period 2. This net return depends on the payo® of the risky asset at date
3 and in particular on the quality of assets purchased at date 2. As we postulate rational
expectations, the LR investor's information set, F, will include the particular equilibrium that
is being played. In computing conditional expectations the LRs assume that the mix of assets
o®ered in period 2 corresponds to the one observed in equilibrium. An LR may also decide
to acquire units of payo®s in period 3 from other LR's but risk neutrality of LR's guarantees
that, in an equilibrium, such trades would be done at prices that do not produce any surplus.
We require a standard, and weak, rationality condition from LRs, that if they succeed
in purchasing some SR projects in period 2 in an equilibrium that prescribes no sales in these
states, and furthermore at a price for which SRs which are in state !2L strictly prefer to hold
the asset until date 3 to selling it in period 2, then LR assumes that he is buying a worthless
asset. In addition, LRs assume that SRs that weakly prefer to sell at price P2 will sell their





0 · M · · (4)
and
Q1P1 + Q2P2 · M and Q1 ¸ 0; Q2 ¸ 0 (5)
The ¯rst constraint (4) is simply the LR investor's wealth constraint: LRs' cannot carry
more cash than their initial capital · and they cannot borrow. The second constraint (5) says
that LRs cannot purchase more risky projects carried by the SRs than their money, M, can
buy and that LRs cannot short risky projects.8
8Below when we comment in the case where the risky projects are nondivisible we will explore the case where
12III.C De¯nition of equilibrium
A rational expectations competitive equilibrium is a vector of portfolio policies [m¤;M¤],




2] and prices [P¤
1;P¤
2] such that (i) at these prices
[m¤;q¤
1;q¤
2] solves PSR and [M¤;Q¤
1;Q¤
2] solves PLR and (ii) markets clear in all states of
nature. An equilibrium must also specify the price S¤
1 that would obtain in event !1L for
payo®s in period 3 and the price S¤
2 for these payo®s that would prevail in period 2. However,
the risk neutrality of the LR's tie these prices to the expected returns of risky projects and
(or) cash.9
III.D Characterization of equilibria
An important property of our model is that it features multiple equilibria for a particular
range of parameter values. Speci¯cally, there are two (stable) equilibria; one where all the
trading occurs at date 1 (in state !1L), and another where all the trading occurs at date 2. We
refer to the ¯rst one as an immediate-trading equilibrium and the second as a delayed-trading
equilibrium. We establish ¯rst existence of these equilibria and then proceed to characterize
inside and outside liquidity across equilibria, as well as the comparative statics of equilibrium
liquidity and prices with respect to µ. These comparative statics results are of central interest,
as they determine both how desirable the risky asset is to SRs and the severity of the adverse
selection at date 2. We conclude this section by studying the welfare properties of the di®erent
equilibria and in particular noting a novel form of ine±ciency that arises in our model relative
to other models that feature adverse selection.
III.D.1 Immediate and delayed-trading equilibria
The immediate-trading equilibrium. Under our stated assumptions we are able to estab-
lish ¯rst that there always exists an immediate-trading equilibrium.
some LRs may trade part of their long run projects in exchange for cash to acquire risky projects, in which case
the budget constraint in (5) would be written di®erently.
9In particular, the price at which sure period 3 payo®s would trade in period 1 in event !1½ is necessarily
equal to 1 in any equilibrium in which LRs hold positive amounts of cash
13Proposition 1. (The immediate-trading equilibrium) Assume A1-A3 hold then there always
exists an immediate-trading equilibrium, where
M¤
i > 0 q¤
1 = Q¤



















´½ < 1, and the price in period
2 of claims to period 3 is S¤
2i = 1: Moreover the cash positions m¤
i and M¤
i are unique.
To gain some intuition on the construction of the immediate-trading equilibrium notice









= '0 (· ¡ M¤
i ); (7)
when m¤
i < 1 and M¤
i > 0.10 These expressions follow immediately from the maximization
problem PSR when we set q¤
1 = 1 ¡ m¤
i, and from problem PLR.
Next to determine the equilibrium price, let P1i be the unique solution to the equation:
¸ + (1 ¡ ¸)
´½
P1i
= '0 (· ¡ P1i); (8)





In this case we can set P¤
1i = P1i, m¤
i = 0, so that SRs are fully invested in the risky asset,
and also M¤
i = P¤
1i which by construction satis¯es the LR's ¯rst order condition. Moreover,
by assumption A1 it must also be the case that M¤
i < ·.
The key step in the construction of the immediate-trading equilibrium then, is that the
price at date 2, P¤
2i, has to be such that both SRs and LRs have incentives to trade at date 1
and not at date 2. That is, it has to be the case that
P¤










10The proof of Proposition 1 establishes that assumption A3 rules out the possibility of a \no trade"
immediate-trading equilibrium in which M
¤
i = 0 and m
¤
i = 1.
14The ¯rst expression in (9) states that SRs prefer to sell assets at date 1 for a price P¤
1i
rather than carrying it to date 2. Indeed if they do the latter, then with probability µ´ the
risky asset pays o® ½ and with probability (1 ¡ µ´) they end up in either !2L or !20 in which
the SRs can sell the asset at price P¤
2i. If the price P¤
2i is low enough then SRs prefer to sell
the asset at date 1.11
The expression on the right hand side of (9) states that for the LR the expected return
of acquiring the asset in state !1L is higher than at date 2. To guarantee this outcome it is
su±cient to set P¤
2i < ±´½ for in this case SRs in state !2L would prefer to carry the asset to
date 3 rather than selling it for that price. This then only leaves \lemons" in the market at
date 2. LRs, anticipating this outcome, set their expectations accordingly, E[e ½3jF] = 0, and
therefore for any strictly positive price P¤
2i < ±´½ LRs prefer to acquire assets in state !1L.






1i equal to the right hand side of (10). At this price, SRs are indi®erent on the
amount of cash carried. Then the solution to the LR's ¯rst order condition (see expression







It is then su±cient to set m¤









which is always possible.12 Finally, the choice of P¤
2i can be taken to be the same as above.
The statements concerning S¤
1i and S¤
2i are immediate. Notice that in our framework, and
by assumption A1, cash-in-the-market has to obtain and prices are lower than their discounted
expected payo®, P¤
1i < ´½, otherwise there would be no incentive for LRs to carry cash. Note
also that this means that, by arbitrage, a unit of output from the long-run project at date 3 has
to trade at a discount at date 1. Thus, in our setup cash-in-the-market pricing is necessarily
transmitted in the form of arbitrage contagion across di®erent markets even if no trading of
the long-run asset occurs in equilibrium. This of course assumes, as we have done here, that
no other capital would °ow to absorb of ¯resales of neither the risky assets nor the long run
projects.
11See expression (21) in the appendix for a precise upper bound on P
¤
2i that has to hold to provide incentives
for the SRs to sell at date 1 rather than at date 2.
12Notice that assumption A2 implies that 1 ¡ ¸½ > 0.
15The delayed-trading equilibrium. Proposition 2 establishes the existence of a delayed-
trading equilibrium.13
Proposition 2 (The delayed-trading equilibrium) Assume A1-A3 hold and that ± is small






1 = 0 and q¤
2 = Q¤
2 = (1 ¡ µ´)(1 ¡ m¤
d):










1 ¡ ½[¸ + (1 ¡ ¸)µ´]














The intuition of how we construct the delayed-trading equilibrium is broadly similar to
the one for the immediate-trading equilibrium, with a few di®erences that we emphasize next.
First, as stated in the proposition, ± needs to be small enough. Speci¯cally, it has to be such
that ±´½ < P¤
2d. Otherwise SRs in state !2L prefer to carry the asset to date 3 rather than
selling it at date 2. This would destroy the delayed-trading equilibrium, as only lemons would
then be traded at date 2. Second, a key di®erence with the immediate-trading equilibrium is
that the supply of risky assets by SRs is reduced under delayed trading by an amount µ´, which
is the proportion of risky assets that pay o® at that date.15 As a result cash-in-the-market










The mass of risky assets supplied in the market at t = 2 is given by (1 ¡ µ´)(1 ¡ m¤
d). Thus
delaying asset liquidation introduces both an adverse selection e®ect which depresses prices,
and a lower supply of the risky asset, which, other things equal, increases prices.
13Recall that we are assuming that q1;q2 2 f0;1 ¡ mg. If instead we had assumed that 0 · q1;q2 · 1 ¡ m
there would also be a third equilibrium, which involves positive asset trading at both dates 1 and 2. We do not
focus on this equilibrium as it is unstable.
14The proof of the proposition clari¯es the upper bound on ± that guarantees existence, see expression (29)
in the Appendix and the discussion therein.
15This is one of the key di®erences that arises when the shocks at date 2 are aggregate rather than idiosyncratic.
In this case the supply of risky assets is always the same.
16As under the immediate-trading equilibrium, to support a delayed-trading equilibrium
requires that both SRs and LRs have incentives to trade at date 2 rather than at date 1, which
means that
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The key step of the proof of Proposition 2 is to show that this interval is non empty.
It is worth emphasizing that the delayed-trading equilibrium collapses to the immediate-
trading equilibrium when µ = 0. Indeed notice, for instance, that the lower bound in the price
P¤
2d in (12) reduces to the lower bound in (6) for P¤
1i. The only di®erence between dates 1 and
2 is thus precisely the occurrence of an idiosyncratic shock that reveals to the SRs the true
value of the risky asset. When µ = 0 there is no informative idiosyncratic signal to be obtained
as at date 1. This feature of our model plays an important role in what follows.
As before, notice that a unit of output from the long-run asset at date 3 trades at a
discount both at dates 1 and 2. Thus, the liquidity event has e®ects in markets other than the
one where distressed sales are taking place, and for as long as the crisis lasts. There may also
be price changes in the long run asset even in the absence of any news about its underlying
value, and even when there is no trading volume in the market for the long-run asset. As
already mentioned, this is what we refer to as arbitrage contagion: Cash-in-the-market pricing
transmits throughout ¯nancial markets inducing movements in prices of unrelated assets even
when there is no news about these other assets and no need to liquidate them.
Before we close this section we introduce the following example to illustrate our results.
As the parameter µ plays a critical role in our analysis it is the focus of our comparative statics,
and we parameterize the set of economies that we consider throughout by the di®erent values
that µ takes. In light of assumption A2 it is then convenient to de¯ne µ as the value for which
1 = ½
£
¸ + (1 ¡ ¸)´½
¡
µ + (1 ¡ µ)±
¢¤
; (15)
for a given ¸, ±, ´, and ½.
17Example 1. In this example the parameter values are:
¸ = :85 ´ = :4 ½ = 1:13 · = :2 ± = :1920 '(x) = x° with ° = :4
Having ¯xed the value of ±, we need to restrict the values of our only free parameter µ
to µ · µ = :4834 to ensure that assumption A2 holds. It is immediate to check that in
this example assumptions A1-A3 hold, as well as assumption A4 below. In particular,
we have
'0 (·) ¼ 1:05 and ½[¸ + (1 ¡ ¸)´] ¼ 1:03
A summary of the main results is as follows:
² Both the immediate and delayed-trading equilibrium exist for µ 2 [0;:4196); more-
over in the delayed-trading equilibrium we have m¤
d > 0.
² For µ 2 [:4196;:4628] both equilibria exist and the delayed-trading equilibrium is
such that m¤
d = 0.
² For µ 2 (:4628;:4834] the delayed-trading equilibrium does not exist. As we explain
below, for this range of µ, the SR discount factor ± is not su±ciently small to induce
SRs in idiosyncratic state !2L to trade at date 2; instead these SRs hold on to the
risky assets until maturity at date 3. 2
III.D.2 Inside and outside liquidity in the immediate and delayed-trading equilibria
How does the composition of inside and outside liquidity vary across equilibria? To
build some intuition on this question it is useful to illustrate the immediate and delayed-
trading equilibria that obtain in our example when µ = :35. Figure 2 represents the immediate
and delayed-trading equilibria in a diagram where the x axis measures the amount of cash
carried by LRs, M, and the y axis the amount of cash carried by the SRs, m. The dashed
lines are the isopro¯t curves of the LRs and the straight (continuous) lines are the SR isopro¯t
lines.16 To see the direction in which payo®s increase as one moves from one isopro¯t curve
to another, it is su±cient to observe that LRs prefer that SRs carry more risky projects for
16To generate these isopro¯t lines note that we can construct an indirect expected pro¯t function for SRs and
LRs as a function of inside and outside liquidity, ¼ [M;m] and ¦[M;m] respectively. The lines plotted in Figures
2 and 3 simply give the combinations of m and M such that ¼ [m;M] = ¼ and ¦[m;M] = ¦. Assumption A3
then simply says that the slope of the isopro¯t lines at M = 0 at date 1 are such that there are gains from
trade: the LR isopro¯t curve is \°atter" than the SR isopro¯t line.
18a given level of outside liquidity, M. In other words, that m is lower. Along the other axis,
LRs also prefer to carry less outside liquidity (lower M) for a given supply of risky projects
by SRs. The converse is true for SRs. In the ¯gure, we display the isopro¯t lines for both
the immediate and delayed-trading equilibrium. It is for this reason that isopro¯t lines appear
to cross in the plot: They simply correspond to di®erent dates. Equilibria are located at the
tangency points between the SR and LR isopro¯t curves.
Consider ¯rst the immediate-trading equilibrium, located at the point marked (M¤
i ;m¤
i) =
(:0169;:9358). There are two isopro¯t curves going through that point; the straight line cor-
responds to the SR, and the dashed-dotted line corresponds to the LR isopro¯t curve. In
fact the straight line corresponds to the SR's reservation utility, ¼ = 1. Thus whatever gains
from trade there are in the immediate-trading equilibrium they accrue entirely to the LRs.
Turn next to the delayed-trading equilibrium, which is marked (M¤
d;m¤
d) = (:0540;:4860) and
features a mix of outside versus inside liquidity that is tilted towards the former relative to the
latter when compared to the immediate-trading equilibrium. The SR's isopro¯t line remains
that associated with it's reservation value.
One way of understanding the portfolio choices in the immediate-trading equilibrium is
that the risky asset is of high quality in state !1L, so that SRs must be compensated with a
high price relative to the price that he would obtain if he were to delay the asset sale to t = 2,
which also includes an adverse selection discount, to be willing to sell the asset at that point.
This observation is re°ected in the slope of the isopro¯t lines in Figure 2: The SRs' isopro¯t
line in the immediate-trading equilibrium is °atter suggesting that SRs require a higher price
per unit of risky asset sold at that date. But this higher price can only come at the expense of
lower returns to holding cash for LRs. The latter are thus induced to cut back on their cash
holdings. This, in turn, makes it less attractive for SRs to invest in the risky asset, and so
on. The outcome is that in the immediate-trading equilibrium most of the liquidity is inside
liquidity held by SRs, whereas the delayed-trading equilibrium features relatively more outside
liquidity than inside liquidity.
The next proposition formalizes this discussion, speci¯cally, it characterizes the mix of
inside versus outside liquidity across the two types of equilibria. For this we make one additional




As the Result in the Appendix shows under assumption A4 the immediate-trading equi-
librium is such that m¤
i 2 (0;1), that is the SRs is carrying a strictly positive amount of cash.
19Roughly, we need to guarantee that m¤
i > 0 in order to obtain non trivial cash allocation
decisions for the SRs, which otherwise would be equal to 0 for both the immediate and the
delayed-trading equilibria, as will become clear in Proposition 4. The present paper is con-
cerned with the ex-ante e±ciency costs associated with portfolio choices that result in the
particular timing of the liquidation decisions and thus the most economically interesting case
is the one where the economy is not \at a corner," that is m¤
i = 0, at the immediate-trading
date. Armed with this new assumption we can prove the following
Proposition 3. (Inside and outside liquidity across equilibria.) Assume that A1-A4 hold
and that ± is small enough so that a delayed-trading equilibrium exists for all µ 2 (0;µ]








d for all µ 2 (0;µ0].
Thus for the range µ 2 [0;µ0] the delayed-trading equilibrium features more outside
liquidity and less inside liquidity than the immediate-trading equilibrium. In our example
µ0 = µ so that Proposition 3 holds for the entire range of admissible µs.17
We close this section by making two additional comments. First, note that all equi-
libria are interim e±cient. That is, conditional on trade occurring in either dates there is
no additional reallocation of the risky asset that would make both sides better o®. As can
be seen immediately in Figure 2, it is not possible to improve the ex-post e±ciency of either
equilibrium, as in each case the equilibrium allocation is located at the tangency point of the
isopro¯t curves. As we shall further explore below, in our model ine±ciencies arise through
distortions in the ex-ante portfolio decisions of SRs and LRs and through the particular timing
of liquidity trades they give rise to. When agents anticipate trade in state !1L, SRs lower their
investment in the risky asset and carry more inside liquidity mi. In contrast LRs, carry less
liquidity Mi as they anticipate fewer units of the risky asset to be supplied in state !1L.
A second observation is that A4, which implies that the immediate-trading equilibrium
is such that m¤
i > 0, does not necessarily imply that m¤
d > 0. Indeed, Figure 3 shows the
immediate and delayed-trading equilibrium when µ is increased from µ = :35, as it was the
case in Figure 2, to µ = :45 and thus the adverse selection problem is relatively worse than
in the previous case. The delayed-trading equilibrium is located in (M¤
d;m¤
d) = (:0716;0),
the immediate-trading equilibrium being una®ected as it is independent of µ. Clearly the
equilibrium is ex-post e±cient, but now, unlike in the case considered in Figure 2, gains from
trade do not solely accrue to the LRs but also to the SRs. In Figure 3 the isopro¯t line marked
17In fact though we have been unable to prove it formally, we have not found an example of an economy that
meets assumptions A1-A4 for which µ
0 < µ.
20IPSR corresponds to the pro¯t level ¼ = 1 for the SR, which is the same as under autarky. The
isopro¯t line through the delayed-trading equilibrium lies strictly to the right of IPSR, which
implies that SRs now command strictly positive pro¯ts. The reason is that at the corner when
m = 0, SRs are at \full capacity" in supplying the risky asset at t = 2. In this case then they
may earn scarcity rents, as LRs compete for the limited supply of the risky asset supplied by
the SRs by increasing their bids for these assets.
III.D.3 Adverse selection and the delayed-trading equilibrium
We examine how changes in the adverse selection problem LRs face at date 2, as measured
by changes in µ, a®ect equilibrium outcomes. In particular, we are interested in understanding
how equilibrium cash holdings and equilibrium prices vary with µ.
Several important e®ects are at work as µ changes, some of which we have already
mentioned. First, the incentives of both SRs and LRs to hold cash are a®ected by changes in
µ. In addition, SRs' incentives to hold onto their asset position until date 2 (when the risky
asset does not mature at date 1) are a®ected. As µ rises the risky asset is more likely to mature
at date 2 and thus becomes more attractive to SRs. Other things equal, SRs are then both
more likely to invest in the risky asset and to carry the asset from date 1 to date 2.
However, as µ rises the adverse selection problem at t = 2 is worsened and therefore
equilibrium prices P¤
2d are likely to be lower. These lower prices that SRs face at t = 2 in turn
reduce their incentives to invest in the risky asset and to carry it to date 2. An additional
complication is that as µ increases the supply of the risky asset at date 2,
s¤
2d ´ (1 ¡ m¤
d (µ))(1 ¡ µ´) (16)
diminishes on account of the fact that a larger share of the available risky assets pay o® and
thus are not liquidated.
We are interested also in the expected return on acquiring the risky asset at date 2 in











2d vary with µ. Throughout we assume, of course, that µ · µ, de¯ned in (15).
21Proposition 4. (Comparative statics.) Assume that A1-A4 hold and that ± is small enough
for all µ 2 [0;µ] so that a delayed-trading equilibrium always exists, then there exists a
unique b µ 2 [0;µ], possibly b µ = µ, such that:
I. The SR's cash position: (a) m¤
d is a (weakly) decreasing function of µ, (b) m¤
d > 0
for all µ 2 [0;b µ) m¤
d = 0 for all µ 2 [b µ;µ] and (c) s¤
2d is a strictly increasing function
of µ for µ 2 [0;b µ) and a strictly decreasing function of µ for µ 2 [b µ;µ].
II. The LR's cash position: M¤
d is a strictly increasing function of µ for µ 2 [0;b µ) and
a strictly decreasing function of µ for µ 2 (b µ;µ].
III. Expected returns at date 2: R¤
d is an increasing function of µ for µ 2 [0;b µ) and a
decreasing function of µ for µ 2 (b µ;µ].
We illustrate the comparative statics described in Proposition 4 in our example, for
which, given our parametric assumption, it can be shown that b µ = :4196. Figures 4 and 5
exhibit the comparative statics with respect to µ for the cash positions, m¤
d and M¤
d, and the
expected return and the price of the risky asset at t = 2, R¤
2d and P¤
2d respectively.
Consider ¯rst Figure 4. As we would expect, based on our discussion above, the amount
of cash carried by the SR is a decreasing function of µ, and m¤
d = 0 for µ ¸ b µ = :4196. It is
less obvious how the amount of cash carried by LR investors varies with µ. Consider ¯rst the
case where µ · b µ. The amount of cash carried by LR investors is then an increasing function
of µ. This is surprising: the more severe the adverse selection problem the more cash carried
by LRs. What is the logic behind this result?
When µ · b µ, an increase in µ does indeed worsen the adverse selection problem and would
result in LRs reducing their supply of liquidity other things equal. But there is a countervailing
e®ect, which is that an increase in µ also results in a higher supply of the risky asset by SRs at
date 2. Indeed, as shown in Proposition 4-I-(c), s¤
d (which is de¯ned in (16)) is an increasing
function of µ in this range.18 It is this higher supply of the risky asset that in turn increases
the supply of outside liquidity. The latter e®ect dominates and thus results in an increasing
M¤
d as a function of µ when µ · b µ. Instead, when µ > b µ the supply e®ect gets reversed and
18There are two e®ects on s
¤
2d when µ · b µ. When µ increases, SRs carry more risky projects; that is m
¤
d
decreases as the risky project is more likely to pay o® at date 2. On the other hand, the higher µ, the lower the
fraction of risky projects carried by SRs that is supplied at date 2. Indeed, notice that the second term in (16),
1 ¡ µ´, is a decreasing function of µ. Proposition 4-I shows that the ¯rst e®ect dominates the second over this
range.
22s¤
d is a decreasing function of µ. Both the supply side and the adverse selection e®ect then
reduce the incentives of LRs to carry cash and it is for this reason that M¤
d is now a decreasing
function of µ.
Figure 5 illustrates how the price P¤
2d changes with µ. As can be seen, P¤
2d is a decreasing
function of µ. But note that the decline is more pronounced when µ < b µ. The reason has
already been mentioned. As long as µ < b µ an increase in µ has a double e®ect. A higher µ
worsens adverse selection concerns and thus the drop in prices. In addition, a higher µ increases
investment in the risky asset, which gets liquidated whenever the SR is in idiosyncratic state
!20 or !2L. This supply e®ect produces a further decline in prices that is absent when µ ¸ b µ for
then m¤
d = 0 and there can be no further investment in the risky asset. Notice that for µ > b µ
prices keep dropping but a lower rate for now the supply is decreasing and thus the competition
for the risky asset amongst the LRs dampens the adverse selection e®ect on prices.
The pattern of returns is also revealing about the incentives of the LRs to carry outside
liquidity to the delayed-trading equilibrium. For µ < b µ, R¤
2d is an increasing function of µ:
The expected payo® of the risky asset in the delayed-trading date is given by (14) which is a
decreasing function of µ. But the price is dropping faster than returns on account both of the
adverse selection e®ect and the supply e®ect. This produces the increasing pattern in returns.
It is for this reason that the incentives of the LRs to carry outside liquidity are also increasing
in µ. Instead when µ > b µ, the expected payo® is still decreasing but the decrease in supply
makes for a slow drop in prices as a function of µ, as we just saw, and thus the negative slope
of R¤
2d as a function of µ in this range.
In conclusion then, for µ 2 [0;b µ] the more severe the adverse selection problem, as
measured by µ, the higher the amount of outside liquidity brought to the market and the lower
the amount of inside liquidity carried by those holding the risky asset. This counterintuitive
result is due to the drop in prices, which makes the risky asset more attractive to the LRs at
t = 2. The larger the liquidity correction at date 2, the more attractive it is for LRs to carry
cash and trade opportunistically. Armed with these insights we turn to the question of the
Pareto ranking of the two equilibria.
III.D.4 Pareto ranking of the immediate and delayed-trading equilibria
Given these di®erences in ex-ante portfolio allocations an obvious question is whether
there a clear ranking of the two equilibria in terms of Pareto e±ciency when they coexist? Inter-
estingly, the answer to this question is yes and, somewhat surprisingly, it is the delayed-trading
equilibrium that Pareto dominates the immediate-trading equilibrium. This is surprising, as
23delayed trade is hampered by the information asymmetry that arises at t = 2, and therefore
will take place at lower equilibrium prices.
Proposition 5. (Pareto ranking of equilibria.) Assume that A1-A4 hold and that ± is small
enough for all µ 2 [0;µ] so that a delayed-trading equilibrium always exists, then there




d for all µ 2 (0;µ0):
In our example µ0 = µ and though we have not been able to prove a tighter character-
ization of Proposition 5, we have been unable to ¯nd an example that meeting assumptions
A1-A4, features µ0 < µ. Thus in our example the delayed-trading equilibrium Pareto dominates
the immediate-trading equilibrium for all µ 2 (0;µ]. This is illustrated in Figure 6, where the
expected pro¯ts of both the SRs and LRs are plotted for a particular range of µs.19
Figure 6 shows the expected pro¯ts of SRs and LRs as a function of µ for the delayed-
trading equilibrium. The top panel shows the SRs' expected pro¯ts. Notice that for µ · b µ =
:4196 the SRs are left at their reservation pro¯ts, which obtain if they were to be fully invested
in cash. Indeed, the SRs' risky asset is a constant returns to scale technology and, a shown
in Proposition 4, in this range they are not fully invested in the risky asset. Figure 2 o®ered
a preview of this result. In that particular case µ = :35 < b µ and thus the delayed-trading
equilibrium was located at the tangency point of the SR's isopro¯t line which corresponds
to its reservation value of ¼ = 1 and the LR's isopro¯t line. The lower panel shows the LR's
expected pro¯t. The °at line corresponds to the LR's expected pro¯t in the immediate-trading
equilibrium, which is everywhere below the expected pro¯t in the delayed-trading equilibrium.
What may be at ¯rst surprising is that the LR's expected pro¯ts are, in this range, an increasing
function of µ: The higher the adverse selection the higher the LR's expected pro¯t. This again
is due to the fact that as we increase µ the asset is more likely to pay at date 2, when SRs care
the most for payo®s, and thus it becomes more attractive to them. This leads them to invest
more in the risky asset and carry less inside liquidity, which translates into more goods for the
LR in the event that the market opens at date 2. The liquidity premium associated with the
adverse selection problem combined with the increased supply of assets translates, as we saw
in Proposition 4, into an improvement of the investment opportunities available to the LRs at
the interim stage, which can only make them better o®.
For µ > b µ the SRs are fully invested in the risky asset and because of this fact they now
acquire some rents. Indeed for this range ¼¤
d > 1 and increasing with µ, whereas for the LRs
the expected pro¯ts are a decreasing function. Notice though that ¦¤
d > ¦¤
i throughout. A
19The starting µ = :35 is simply chosen to show the ¯gures in a convenient scale.
24particular example was depicted in Figure 3, where an example was shown where µ = :45 > b µ.
As could be seen there, the delayed-trading equilibrium was located strictly in the interior of
the lens formed by the two reservation isopro¯t lines.
III.D.5 Discussion: Welfare and outside versus inside liquidity
In our setup a higher social surplus can be achieved when the aggregate amount of cash
held by investors is lowered and when investment in risky and long run projects is increased.
But recall that under assumption A2, SRs only want to hold cash in autarchy and do not
want to implement risky projects. They are only prepared to invest in risky projects if enough
outside liquidity is provided by LRs to absorb the potential sales of risky projects following
a liquidity shock at either dates 1 or 2. SRs are endowed with an investment opportunity
they don't want to exploit in autarchy even though it is socially e±cient to do so, unless they
can distribute the investment to LRs in exchange for cash in some contingencies. The SR
investment technology is a constant returns to scale technology. Therefore, from a social point
of view e±ciency requires minimization of inside liquidity. Thus the key trade-o® is between the
e±ciency gain from lower inside liquidity and the e±ciency loss from higher outside liquidity.
In the delayed-trading equilibrium, inside liquidity is lower and the amount of risky
projects originated is larger than in the immediate-trading equilibrium. But, there is also
more outside liquidity. The higher amount of risky projects originated is an e±ciency gain,
whereas the larger amount of outside liquidity is an e±ciency loss.20 However, in our model the
e±ciency gain more than o®sets the e±ciency loss. The reason is that the amount of outside
liquidity that LRs hold in the delayed-trading equilibrium is not very large relative to the
amount of cash they hold in the immediate-trading equilibrium. Also, in the delayed-trading
equilibrium SRs retain the risky asset's upside (in idiosyncratic state !2½), and they need to
be compensated for giving up this upside option in the immediate-trading equilibrium. This
compensation can only come in the form of more outside liquidity at date 1, as re°ected in the
higher price of the risky asset at that date compared with the price at date 2.
III.D.6 Trading of indivisible risky projects
In our equilibria SRs sell their entire risky investment conditional on selling any risky
assets. The risky assets can be sold in pieces or whole and we have not imposed any restrictions
20Recall that we were able to prove this result for the range µ 2 [0;µ
0], where µ
0 · µ, and not for the entire
range (see Proposition 5 and the discussion therein.) To reiterate though, we have been unable to ¯nd an
example for which µ
0 < µ
25on whether these assets are sold piecemeal or not. In this subsection we explore the conse-
quences of restricting trade in risky assets to selling indivisible projects to LRs. The motivation
for imposing this restriction is that assets may be physically indivisible and information about
each project's quality is itself indivisible.
Recall that in the delayed trading equilibrium a fraction µ´ of the risky projects return ½
and are not available for trading. If the risky projects are indivisible, a fraction (1¡µ´) of the
LRs must end up buying all the risky projects while the remaining LRs would only hold period
3 sure payo®s. We must therefore check whether LRs that end up with the risky projects have
enough cash, and wealth,21 to ¯nance their purchases. The total value of the risky projects
that are held in the delayed equilibrium by µ´ LR's is µ´P¤
2d(1 ¡ m¤
d): In turn, the total value












d) ¸ µ´(1 ¡ m¤
d) (17)
Hence inequality (17) also holds for theta su±ciently small. In addition it can be veri¯ed
that inequality (17) holds for every example of delayed equilibrium we have provided. Given
this, it is immediate that LRs are indi®erent between exchanging their cash for additional units
of the long project or for the SRs' risky projects. Thus to be able to purchase \indivisible"
risky projects at ¯resale prices, LRs may also have to sell some of their holdings on the long
run project.
Alternatively, we could have assumed that the decreasing returns to long run projects
are due to a pecuniary externality that depends on the average amount invested by all LRs.
That is, the output produced in period 3 with x units invested at date 0 equals xÁ(¹ x), where ¹ x
is the average LR investment and Á is a concave function. Under this interpretation, every LR
is indi®erent between holding cash or investing in the long run project in equilibrium. Besides
capturing an important aggregate economic e®ect, this formulation also makes it easier to
accommodate the discreteness of long-run projects.
21If LRs purchasing risky assets do not hold enough cash they can sell their claims to their period 3 consump-
tion to other LRs who are not purchasing risky assets and thus obtain su±cient cash to absorb the ¯resales.
26III.E Two forms of ine±ciency
Adverse selection plays an important role in our framework and introduces two sources
of ine±ciency. The ¯rst one is standard and is discussed in section III.E.2. As in Akerlo®
(1970), when the adverse selection premium is large enough good risks (SRs in !2L) withdraw
their supply of the risky asset leaving only \lemons" in the market, which leads to a market
breakdown. The other, novel source of ine±ciency (to the best of our knowledge), is that the
presence of adverse selection at date 2 gives rise to an ine±cient immediate-trading equilibrium
at date 1, when the parties can trade under symmetric information. In other words, the pres-
ence of adverse selection may ine±ciently accelerate asset liquidation. We begin by discussing
this ine±ciency in section III.E.1.
III.E.1 Existence of the immediate-trading equilibrium
We have shown that the delayed-trading equilibrium Pareto dominates the immediate-
trading equilibrium. We now show that it is the presence of asymmetric information at date 2
that introduces the possibility of immediate trading in equilibrium at date 1.
Proposition 6 (Unique full information equilibrium) Assume that A1-A3 hold, that ± is
small enough and that LRs observe whether SRs are in idiosyncratic state !2L or !20.
Then the unique equilibrium is the delayed-trading equilibrium.
A formal derivation of the delayed-trading equilibrium is given in the appendix. Here
we simply show that it is not possible to support an immediate-trading equilibrium when
agents are symmetrically informed. Indeed, the conditions for a putative immediate-trading
equilibrium are
P¤




But these conditions imply that P¤
1i ¸ ´½; which, given (18), in turn imply that P¤
2i ¸ ´½: Given
that the expected gross payo® of the asset for LRs is always ´½ under symmetric information,
it follows that the expected return of carrying cash for LRs cannot be greater than one.
Thus M¤
i = 0, which implies m¤
i = 0. Notice that when LRs are not informed about the
idiosyncratic state !2L or !20, it is possible to set P¤
2d < ±´½ and to support an immediate-
trading equilibrium as in the proof of Proposition 1. But this is no longer possible under
symmetric information. Thus the presence of adverse selection can give rise to an ine±cient
acceleration of liquidity trading that would not occur if agents were symmetrically informed.
27III.E.2 Non existence of the delayed-trading equilibrium
A maintained assumption throughout our analysis in section III.D is that ± is small
enough that existence of the delayed-trading equilibrium is assured. In this subsection we
explore the model solution for higher values of delta. An important feature of our model is
that SRs in state !2L may prefer to carry the asset to date 3 rather than trading it for the
(candidate) price P¤
2d at date 2.22 When this happens the delayed-trading exchange cannot be
supported as a competitive equilibrium for then only lemons would be traded in the market.
SRs in state !2L would have an incentive to retain the asset and carry it to date 3 whenever the
candidate delayed-trading equilibrium price is such that PC
2d < ±´½ where PC
2d is the candidate
price for the risky asset at date 2 constructed as in Proposition 2. In our example this occurs
for the range of economies for which µ 2 (:4628;:4834).
To illustrate graphically the welfare costs associated with this lack of existence, Figure
7 plots the expected pro¯ts for the SRs and the LRs as a function of µ where we have selected
the Pareto superior equilibrium whenever both equilibria coexist. There are three regions in
the plot. The ¯rst two correspond to the cases already discussed. In region A, µ 2 (0;:4196)
the delayed-trading equilibrium is Pareto superior and is such that m¤
d > 0. Region B, µ 2
[:4196;:4628), also features the delayed-trading equilibrium as the Pareto superior one and in
that range of µs, m¤
d = 0. Region C is one where, though assumptions A1-A4 are met, a
delayed-trading equilibrium cannot be supported and thus the immediate-trading equilibrium
gets selected.
The dashed line in both panels of Figure 7 shows the additional expected pro¯ts that
would accrue to SRs and LRs if the former could commit ex-ante to liquidate their assets at
the candidate price e P2d in state !2L. In this case, the LRs anticipating that the pool of assets
supplied at date 2 would also include assets of higher quality would be willing to bring more
outside liquidity than in the immediate-trading equilibrium. As shown above, this is always
Pareto improving in our framework because it substitutes inside with outside liquidity.
III.F Monopolistic supply of liquidity and e±ciency
So far we have assumed that outside liquidity is supplied competitively, so that LRs
do not take into account the e®ect that their choices have on the equilibrium price P¤
2d. A
monopoly LR, on the other hand, would internalize the e®ect of its supply of liquidity on the
price. The obvious question then arises whether a monopoly LR might be more e±cient in
22It is easy to check that A2 implies that it is never optimal to retain the asset in an immediate-trading
equilibrium constructed as above.
28situations where the competitive delayed-trading equilibrium fails to exist?
When µ < b µ, where b µ was de¯ned in Proposition 4, SRs carry a strictly positive amount
of inside liquidity m¤
d > 0 and make zero pro¯ts. All the surplus goes to the LRs, who cannot
obtain higher pro¯ts by changing their holdings of liquidity. It follows then that in this range
the competitive and monopoly solutions are identical. In contrast, when µ ¸ b µ, the level of
inside liquidity in the competitive equilibrium is m¤
d = 0, LRs compete for a ¯xed supply of
the risky asset, and SRs obtain some of the surplus from trade. In this situation, a monopoly
LR would gain by restricting its supply of outside liquidity and thereby raising the price P¤
2d.
This can be seen in Figure 8, where, in the top panel, the pro¯ts of the monopolist are plotted
together with the competitive ones and in the bottom panel the prices in states (!20;!2L) are
plotted against µ.
Notice ¯rst that in region A, which corresponds to the case µ < b µ, the prices and pro¯ts
in a monopoly are identical to those under perfect competition. In region B, SRs set the level
of inside liquidity to m¤
d = 0 and the monopoly LR restricts the supply of outside liquidity so
as to capture fully all the gains from trade. This explains why the price of the risky asset at
t = 2 under a monopoly is below the competitive price.
But once µ exceeds a certain threshold the competitive delayed-trading equilibrium no
longer exists. The monopoly LR in this case has to set the price for the risky asset to ±´½
to guarantee a pro¯table trade at date 2. In this parameter region, region C in Figure 8,
a monopoly LR will indeed improve e±ciency. By carrying and supplying enough outside
liquidity the monopolist elicits the supply of risky assets by SRs in state !2L, thus avoiding
the break down of the delayed exchange. Notice that as shown in the top panel of Figure 8,
the monopoly's pro¯ts are, in this region, above those that obtain in the immediate-trading
equilibrium, which is the only one that exists with competitive LRs.23
IV. LONG-TERM CONTRACTS FOR LIQUIDITY
IV.A Long-term contracts
So far we have only allowed SRs and LRs to trade assets for cash at dates 1 and 2, after
they have each made their portfolio investment decisions at date 0. We saw that when the
lemon cost is severe a delayed-trading equilibrium may fail to exist and that there is value in
SRs's commitment to sell the risky asset at t = 2 to avoid the market breakdown that occurs in
23It is worth emphasizing than in this region SR pro¯ts are such that ¼ > 1. The reason is that the monopolist
has to \leave some rents" to the SRs precisely to elicit the supply of the assets in state !2L.
29its absence. A natural question arises whether some form of long term contract between an SR
and LR at date 0 may improve on the outcome obtained in the immediate and delayed-trading
equilibria. Allowing for a bilateral contract between the SR and the LR expands the set of
states that can be contracted upon as, in principle, transfers can now be made contingent on
!2½, !20, and !2L. This was not possible when liquidity is provided via the market as in that
case the price for transacting at time t = 2, P2, cannot be made contingent on !2½, !20, or
!2L. A key point of this section is that, perhaps surprisingly, the additional contractibility
that long term contracts allow for may not yield an e±ciency improvement over the market
provision of liquidity investigated in the previous section.
Speci¯cally we allow for long term contract between one SR and one LR by which the SR
transfers to the LR both his investment opportunity as well as his unit of endowment.24 The
fund run by the LR allocates the total endowment (1 + ·) of the two investors in a portfolio
that may comprise the long-run asset, the risky asset, and cash. Since there is only one unit
of risky projects available, we assume that each fund cannot invest more than one unit of
endowment in the risky asset. The LR manager in turn promises payments that are contingent
on the announced state of nature,
Ct(!) for t = 1;2;3 and ! 2 f!1½;!1L;!2½;!20;!2L;!30;!3½g; (19)
where Ct (!) is the transfer from the from the LR to the SR at date t when the announcement
is that the state of the risky project is given by !. The key assumption is that now, the
LR in the long term contract with the SR is managing the funds and investments and thus
information regarding the realization of the risky project at t = 2 and t = 3 accrues only to
him: If the LR chooses to invest part of the endowments in the risky asset then it is the LR
who privately observes the realization of the idiosyncratic shocks a®ecting the risky asset at
dates 2 and 3. Intuitively then an LR investing in the risky asset faces incentive compatibility
constraints, which limit the e±ciency of the long-term contract.25
Finally we assume throughout that ±'(·) < 1, so that the LR investor would not ¯nd it
optimal to simply invest the whole endowment (1 + ·) in the long asset and repay the SR at
date 3.
24Obviously, a long term contract in which the entire LR industry contracts with the entire SR industry could
achieve a better outcome by virtue of e®ectively eliminating the asymmetric information between parties.
25Note that if the SR investor can also observe the realization of idiosyncratic shocks then the asymmetric
information problem in the delayed-trading equilibrium would not be present, so that the long-term contract at
date 0 would clearly yields a superior outcome. The more consistent and interesting case, however, is when the
observation of idiosyncratic shocks is private information to the manager of the risky asset.
30IV.B Feasibility, Participation and incentive compatibility constraints
As mentioned, information about the risky asset accrues now to the LR and thus incen-
tives have to be provided for a truthful revelation of the state of nature. We start with date
3; having announced at date 2 that the state of nature is !2L incentive compatibility requires
that at date 3
C3 (!3½) = C3 (!30);
for otherwise the LR simply announces the state which involves the lower payment to SR.
Given this, date 2 incentive compatibility requires that,
C2 (!2L) + C3 (!30) = C2 (!20) + C3 (!20) = C2 (!2½) + C3 (!2½)
Otherwise, again, LR would always announce the state which involves the lowest total payout.
As for the feasibility constraints, given that the SR is indi®erent between consumption
at date 1 and 2 then, without loss of generality, we can restrict contracts to those that set
C1 (!1½) = C1 (!1L) = 0. Then, for instance, the feasibility constraints associated with !1½ are
C2½ (!1½) · ®x½ + Mx and C2 (!1½) + C3 (!1½) · ®x½ + Mx + '(yx);
where ®x · 1 is the amount that the LR invests in the risky project under the long term
contract, Mx is the cash position and
yx = · + 1 ¡ ®x ¡ Mx
is the amount invested in the long project. The rest of the feasibility constraints follow along
similar lines and in the interest of space they are relegated to the Appendix.
Finally, because our purpose in this section is to assess to what extent the long run
contract can do better than the market provision of liquidity, we simply leave the SR with the
expected pro¯ts he would obtain in the delayed-trading equilibrium and thus assign all the




x is the LR's expected pro¯t under the ex-ante contract.
IV.C Long term contracts and the market provision of liquidity
As is easy to see, when SR investors expect the immediate-trading equilibrium, then
any pair of LR and SR investors are weakly better o® writing a long-term contract at date 0.
Indeed, at worst the contract simply replicates the allocation under immediate trading. But,
the contract can also implement other allocations that are not feasible under the immediate-
trading equilibrium, in particular by investing part of the SR endowment in the LR project
31and by specifying payments to SR that (weakly) dominate the allocation under immediate
trading:
C1(!1½) ¸ m¤
i + ¸(1 ¡ m¤
i)½
C1(!1L) ¸ m¤
i + (1 ¡ m¤
i)P¤
1i:
The following proposition, which is given without proof, then obtains,
Proposition 7. (Ranking of long-term contract and immediate-trading equilibrium) The
optimal long-term contract weakly (and sometimes strictly) dominates the equilibrium
allocation under immediate trading.
In contrast, when SR investors expect the delayed-trading equilibrium, then the long-
term contract cannot always replicate the allocation under delayed trading. The reason is that
under delayed trading, SRs face di®erent incentive constraints at date 2 from those faced by
LRs under the long-term contract.
Under delayed-trading, the SR investor seeking to trade assets for cash at date 2 must
trade assets at the same price in states !20 and !2L to be induced to truthfully reveal these two
states to LRs. However, in state !2½ there is no trade between SR and LR, and therefore also
no need to reveal that state truthfully to LR. In other words, no incentive constraint applies
in this state of nature.
Under the long-term contract, however, LR promises transfers to SR as in (19). As
we have argued above, transfer must satisfy incentive compatibility. Therefore, LR simply
cannot replicate the allocation under the delayed-trading equilibrium with a suitable long-
term contract. Given that the delayed-trading equilibrium allocation is not in the feasible set
for the long-term contract it is not obvious a priori which allocation is superior. To be able
to answer this question we must ¯rst characterize the optimal long-term contract (when SR
requires a payo® at least as high as under the delayed-trading equilibrium).
Solving the long-term contracting problem is a somewhat tedious constrained optimiza-
tion problem, as it involves two investment variables (®;M) and, e®ectively, seven state-
contingent transfers to SR. This problem can be simpli¯ed to some extent, as the next proposi-
tion establishes, since the combination of all the incentive and feasibility constraints reduce the
long-term contracting problem to the determination of optimal values for only: i) the amount
® 2 [0;1] invested in the risky SR project, ii) the amount M of cash held by the fund, and iii)
payments to SR in states !1½, !2½ and !30.
32Proposition 8. (Characterization of the long term contract)
I. Without loss of generality, any feasible, incentive-compatible long-term contract
between LR and SR takes the form:
C2(!) C3(!)
!1½ M + ®½ C3 (!1½)
!2½ C2(!2½) C3(!2½)
!20 M C3 (!30)
!2L;!30 M C3 (!30)
!2L;!3½ M C3 (!3½)
II. Suppose that ± is close to zero and that
´(1 ¡ ¸)½ + '(0) · '(·); (A5)
then the optimal long-term contract is such that C3(!1½) = C3(!2½) = 0:
Given that SR discounts date 3 consumption by ± it seems ine±cient to o®er any date 3
consumption to SR. Still, we cannot rule out that C3 (!) > 0 for either ! 2 f!1½;!2½;!30;!3½g
since a date 3 transfer in one state may be required for LR to satisfy all incentive constraints
he faces. That is, to be able to credibly disclose that the realized state is !20, for example,
LR may have to promise a high transfer C3 (!30) at date 3. Nevertheless, intuition suggests
that if ± is very small, ¸ su±ciently large, and the opportunity cost of holding cash for LR is
bounded, then the optimal contract ought to specify C3(!1½) = C3(!2½) = 0. This is indeed
what Proposition 8-II establishes.
With this characterization of the optimal long-term contract we are able to numerically
solve for the optimal contract and to compare LR payo®s under the contract to LR equilibrium
payo®s under the delayed-trading equilibrium. We then show that for some parameter values,
the long-term contract is dominated by the delayed-trading equilibrium outcome for high values
of µ.
The economic logic behind this result is that when µ is high then the SR risky asset
already matures most of the time at dates 1 or 2. The added value of additional liquidity
o®ered by LR through a long-term contract is then not that high. In addition, when µ is high
LR also faces high costs of meeting incentive constraints under the long-term contract. To be
able to credibly claim that the risky asset did not yield a return ½ at either dates 1 or 2, LR
must commit to wasteful date 3 payments C3(!3½) = C3(!30) > 0 which SR does not value
33much. The deadweight cost of these distortions exceeds the bene¯t of extra liquidity insurance,
which is why the delayed-trading equilibrium outcome is superior.
Example 2. In our example we keep µ as a free parameter and ¯x the other parameters to
the following values:
¸ = :7 ´ = :4 ½ = 1:25 k = :12 ± = :1 and '(x) = x° with ° = :19:
Note that all our assumptions are then met as long as µ · :8148, which is the ¯rst value
of µ for which the assumption [¸ + (1 ¡ ¸)´ [µ + (1 ¡ µ)±]] · 1 is violated. Accordingly
our plots below are restricted to the interval µ 2 [0;:8148].
The payo®s of SR and LR under the long-term contract are given by respectively:
¼¤
x = ¸[M + ®½ + ±C3(!1½)]
+ (1 ¡ ¸)[µ´(C2(!2½) + ±C3(!2½)) + (1 ¡ µ´)(M + ±C3(!30))]
¦¤
x = M + '[· + (1 ¡ ®) ¡ M] + ¸[®½ ¡ (C2(!1½) + C3(!1½))]
+ (1 ¡ ¸)[´®½ ¡ (M + C3(!30))]:
As mentioned we set ¼¤
x = ¼¤
d the SR payo® in the delayed-trading equilibrium. Numerical
computations show that for the chosen parameter values the optimal long-term contract
is such that C3(!1½) = C3(!2½) = C3(!30) = 0, and therefore that C2(!2½) = M.
Note that unlike in the previous example, a delayed-trading equilibrium always exists
here. In the top panel of Figure 9 we graph the expected utility of the SR in the delayed-
trading equilibrium as a function of µ whereas the bottom panel shows the expected
utility of the LR in the delayed-trading equilibrium, ¦¤
d, as well as the LR's expected
payo® under the long-term contract, ¦¤
x. For µ > ~ µ this payo® is less than what LR
gets in the delayed-trading equilibrium. The bottom panel of Figure 10 shows that when
µ increases, the amount of cash carried by the LR to ful¯ll his commitments under the
long-term contract increases, making the contract less e±cient, in sharp contrast with the
total amount of cash m¤
d + M¤
d carried by both the LRs and SRs in the delayed-trading
equilibrium, shown in the top panel of the same ¯gure. This increase in cash follows
because the expected payo® of SR in the delayed-trading equilibrium increases with µ.
Incentive constraints limit the di®erence in payments in states !2½ and !20, and since
payments at date 3 are very ine±cient, the contract speci¯es higher payments at date 2,
which requires carrying more cash. 2
34V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper is concerned with two questions. First, what determines the mix of inside and
outside liquidity in equilibrium? Second, does the market provide an e±cient mix of inside and
outside liquidity? In addition we asked whether the provision of market liquidity can be Pareto
improved upon by long term contracts between those with potential liquidity needs and those
who are likely to supply it. A novel dimension of our model is the cross sectional supply of
liquidity, which seems to be a core feature of modern ¯nancial markets, where di®erent actors
outside the regulated ¯nancial intermediary sectors that stand ready to absorb asset sales by
distressed ¯nancial intermediaries.26 The incentives of the di®erent parties to carry liquidity
in our model are driven by their di®erent opportunity costs and di®erent investment horizons.
An important question we address is whether a competitive price mechanism would elicit the
optimal cross-sectional cash reserve decisions by all the di®erent actors.
A second element in the model that departs from the existing literature is the endogenous
timing of asset sales and the deterioration of adverse selection problems over time. Financial
intermediaries face the choice of raising liquidity early, or in anticipation of a crisis, before
adverse selection problems set in, or in the midst of a crisis at more depressed prices. The
bene¯t of delaying asset sales and attempting to ride through the crisis is that the intermediary
may be able to entirely avoid any sale of assets at distressed prices should the crisis be short
and mild. We show that when the adverse selection problem is not too severe there are multiple
equilibria, an immediate-trading and a delayed-trading equilibrium. In the ¯rst equilibrium,
intermediaries liquidate their positions in exchange for cash early in the liquidity crisis. In the
second equilibrium, liquidation takes place late in the liquidity event and in the presence of
adverse selection problems.
We show that surprisingly the latter equilibrium Pareto-dominates the former because
it saves on cash reserves, which are costly to carry. However, the delayed-trading equilibrium
does not exist when the adverse selection problem is severe enough. The reason is that in
this case prices are so depressed as to make it pro¯table for the agents holding good assets to
carry them to maturity even when it is very costly to do so. We show that if they were able
26For instance, a recent article in the Wall Street Journal of Friday May 9th 2008 by Lingling Wei and
Jennifer S. Forsyht emphasized that the discounts on commercial real estate debt are less pronounced than
in the previous real-estate collapse of the early 1990s. As the authors point out \[t]oday there are at least
55 active or planned commercial real-estate debt funds seeking to raise $33.8 billion, according to Real Estate
Alert, a trade publication. And many have begun to do deals." In the recent period of distress that started
in the summer of 2007, the role of sovereign funds has been notorious and major source of recapitalization for
institutions such as Citi.
35to do so, intermediaries would be better o® committing ex-ante to liquidating their assets at
these depressed prices in the distressed states. We also show, perhaps more surprisingly, that
a monopoly supplier of liquidity may be able to improve welfare.
We argued in Bolton, Santos and Scheinkman (2009) that the role of the public sector
as a provider of liquidity has to be understood in the context of a competitive provision of
liquidity by the private sector very much like the one we propose in this paper. In particular
the public provision of liquidity can act as a complement for private liquidity in situations
where lemon's problems are so severe that the market would break down without any public
price support. Clearly for the intervention to be e®ective the public liquidity provider needs
to know whether the crisis is in date 1 or 2. An important remaining task is then to analyze
the bene¯ts of public policy in our model under the assumption that the public agency may
be ignorant about the true state of nature in which it is intervening.
Another central theme in our analysis is the particular timing of the liquidity crisis that
we propose. Liquidity crisis have, in our opinion, always real origins, small as they may be. In
our framework the onset of the liquidity event starts with a real deterioration of the quality of
the risky asset held by ¯nancial intermediaries. The assumption that adverse selection problems
worsen during the liquidity crisis is perhaps the most novel of our modeling assumptions and
seems reasonable in some crisis like the present one. Here our framework captures the fact
that intermediaries were holding securities which had a degree of complexity that made for a
costly assessment of the actual risk they were exposed to (see Gorton (2008) for an elaboration
of this important point.) Once problems in the mortgage market were widely reported in early
2007 banks turned to an assessment of the actual risks buried in their books. As emphasized
by Holmstrom (2008), the opacity of these securities was initially the source of liquidity. Once
the crisis started though banks and intermediaries started the costly process of risk discovery
in their books, which immediately led to an adverse selection problem. Financial institutions
here faced a choice of whether to liquidate early or ride out the crisis in the hope that the asset
may ultimately pay o®. This trade-o® is unrelated to the incentives that may force institutions
to liquidate at particular times due to accounting and credit quality restrictions in the assets
they can hold that have featured more prominently in the literature. Understanding the e®ect
that these restrictions have on the portfolio decisions of the di®erent intermediaries remains
an important question to explore in future research.
Finally, in our model LRs are those with su±cient knowledge to be able to value and
absorb the risky assets for sale by ¯nancial intermediaries. Only their capital and liquid
reserves matter for equilibrium pricing to the extent that they are the only participants with
36the knowledge to perform an adequate valuation. Other, less knowledge intensive, capital
will only step in at steeper discounts for which there may be no market. Our current work
focuses precisely on understanding how di®erent knowledge-capital gets \earmarked" to speci¯c
markets. What arises is a theory of market segmentation and contagion that, we believe may
shed light on the behavior of ¯nancial markets in states of crisis.
37REFERENCES
Acharya, Viral (2001) \A Theory of Systemic Risk and Design of Prudential Bank Regulation" manuscript,
New York University and London Business School.
Acharya, Viral and Tanju Yorulmazer (2005) \Cash-in-the-market Pricing and Optimal Bank Bailout
Policy," manuscript, CEPR.
Aghion, Philippe, Patrick Bolton, and Mathias Dewatripont (2000) \Contagious Bank Failures in a
Free Banking System" European Economic Review, May.
Allen, Franklin and Douglas Gale (1998) \Optimal Financial Crisis," Journal of Finance, 53, 1245-1284.
Bhattacharya, Sudipto and Douglas Gale (1986) \Preference Shocks, Liquidity, and Central Bank
Policy," manuscript, CARESS Working Paper #86-01, University of Pennsylvania.
Bolton, Patrick, Tano Santos and Jose A. Scheinkman (2009) \Market Liquidity and Public Liquidity,"
American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, forthcoming.
Brunnermeier, Markus and Lasse Pedersen (2008) \Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity," Review
of Financial Studies, forthcoming.
Bryant, John (1980) \A Model of Reserves, Bank Runs, and Deposit Insurance" Journal of Banking and
Finance, 3, 335-344.
Diamond, Douglas W. and Philip H. Dybvig (1983) \Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity"
Journal of Political Economy, vol. 91 no. 3, 401-419.
Diamond, Douglas W. (1997) \Liquidity, Banks, and Markets" Journal of Political Economy, vol. 105 no.
5, 928-956.
Diamond, Douglas W. and Raghuram Rajan (2005) \Liquidity Shortage and Banking Crisis," Journal
of Finance, April.
Dow, James and Gary Gorton (1993), \Arbitrage Chains", NBER Working Paper No. W4314. Available
at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=478730
Fecht, Falko (2004) \On the Stability of Di®erent Financial Systems," Journal of the European Economic
Association, vol. 2 no. 6, 969-1014.
38Freixas, Xavier, Bruno Parigi and Jean-Charles Rochet (2000) \Systemic Risk, Interbank Relations,
and Liquidity Provision by the Central Bank" Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 32 (2),
611-638.
Gorton, Gary (2008) \The Panic of 2007," working paper, Yale School of Management.
Gorton, Gary (2008) \The Subprime Panic," working paper, Yale School of Management.
Gorton, Gary and Lixin Huang (2004) \Liquidity, E±ciency, and Bank Bailouts," American Economic
Review, vol. 94 no. 3, 455-483.
Gromb, Dennis and Dimitri Vayanos (2002) \Financially Constrained Arbitrage and the Cross-section
of Market Liquidity," manuscript, London Business School.
Holmstron, Bengt (2008) \Comment on The Panic of 2007 by Gary Gorton " working paper, MIT, forth-
coming in Maintaining Stability in a Changing Financial System, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
Holmstron, Bengt and Jean Tirole (1998) \Private and Public Supply of Liquidity" Journal of Political
Economy, vol. 106 no. 1, 1-40.
Holmstron, Bengt and Jean Tirole (2008) \Inside and Outside Liquidity" Wicksell lectures, forthcoming,
available at http://idei.fr/doc/by/tirole/
Jacklin, Charles J. (1987) \Demand Deposits, Trading Restrictions, and Risk Sharing." In E.C. Prescott,
and N. Wallace (ed.), Contractual Arrangements for Intertemporal Trade, University of Minnesota Press.
Kondor, Peter (2008) \Risk in Dynamic Arbitrage: The Price E®ects of Convergence," Journal of Finance,
forthcoming.
Kyle, Peter and Wei Xiong (2001) \Contagion as a Wealth E®ect," Journal of Finance, vol. 56, 1401-
1440.
Parlour, Christine and Guillaume Plantin (2008) \Loan Sales and Relationship Banking," Journal of
Finance, forthcoming.
Xiong, Wei (2001) \Convergence Trading with Wealth E®ects," Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 62,
247-292.
39APPENDIX





2i. We show that under those prices SRs prefer to sell the risky asset at date 1, rather than selling at
date 2 or alternatively carrying the asset to date 2, taking the chance that the asset may payo® in !2½,
or to date 3 if in !2L, or swapping the risky asset for units of the long asset (trading at S
¤
1i).
The ¯rst order condition of the LR is




0 (· ¡ M): (20)
First we establish that it is not possible to support an equilibrium with M
¤
i = 0 and m
¤
i = 1. Indeed if
m
¤






but by assumption A3 this implies








i > 0 a contradiction.
Having ruled the no trade immediate-trading equilibrium we proceed next as follows. Start by solving
the following equation in P1i










a positive number by assumption A2.




i = P1i and m
¤
i = 0, which meets the ¯rst
order condition of the SRs as can be checked by inspection of expression (2).
² Case 2: Assume next that P1i < P, then set P
¤
1i = P and M
¤
i to be the solution to




0 (· ¡ M
¤
i );
which by assumption A3 is such that M
¤
i > 0 and clearly it has to be such that M
¤
i < P. Because,


















2i < ±´½: (21)
Given this price the LR investors expect only lemons (assets with zero payo®) in the market at t = 2 and
thus the demand is equal to zero Q
¤
2 = 0. As for the SRs notice that if they wait to liquidate at t = 2
they obtain
µ´½ + (1 ¡ µ´)P
¤
2i < µ´½ +





and thus SRs set q
¤
2 = 0 and q
¤





40Notice as well that under these prices SRs prefer to liquidate rather than carry the asset to date 2 or
3. Indeed, given that we have established that SRs do not want to sell at t = 2, if instead they were to
carry the asset to dates t = 2 (where the asset pays with probability µ´) or take its chances at date t = 3
(in which case the asset is worth ±´½ in !2L) it must be because:
P
¤











< µ´½ + (1 ¡ µ)±´½ (24)
which, once rearranged, yields
1 < ¸½ + (1 ¡ ¸)[µ + (1 ¡ µ)±]´½; (25)
a contradiction with A2. Finally, it is obvious that the SRs do not want to trade into the long asset.
Indeed, assume they do. In this case the number of units of the long asset that they can acquire are ´½,
which are only worth ±´½ to them which is clearly below P
¤
1i.




2i they follow immediately from arbitrage.
2
Proof of Proposition 2. We ¯rst construct a candidate delayed-trading equilibrium and then establish the
conditions on ± under which the candidate delayed-trading equilibrium is indeed an equilibrium.
First notice that since '






2d (1 ¡ µ´)(1 ¡ m
¤
d)
De¯ne P2d to be the solution to




0 (· ¡ (1 ¡ µ´)P2d)








There are two cases to consider:
² Case 1: P2d is such that
P2d <
1 ¡ ½[¸ + (1 ¡ ¸)µ´]
(1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ µ´)
= P: (26)






d to be the solution of
¸ + (1 ¡ ¸)
(1 ¡ µ)´½
(1 ¡ µ´)P ¤
2d
= '
0 (· ¡ M
¤
d); (27)
which from the strict concavity of '(¢) is
M
¤





d > 0. Indeed, de¯ne




1 ¡ ½[¸ + (1 ¡ ¸)µ´]

;
which is the left hand side of the LR's ¯rst order condition as shown in (27). Notice that A3 can
be simply written as Ã(0) > '
0 (·). Straightforward algebra shows that











(1 ¡ µ´)(1 ¡ m¤
d)
Notice that because P
¤
2d = P the SRs are indi®erent in the level of cash held. Both types of traders
would prefer to wait to trade at date 2 provided that P
¤


















Clearly, given assumption A1, speci¯cally the fact that '
0 (·) > 1, and equation (27), equation (28)
is trivially met. Clearly, given assumption A1, speci¯cally the fact that '
0 (·) > 1, and equation
(27), equation (28) is trivially met.
Notice that P
¤







the SR (weakly) prefers to trade at date 2 for a price P
¤
2d than carrying the asset to date 3.
² Case 2: P2d ¸ P, then choose
P
¤




2d (1 ¡ µ´) > 0 and m
¤
d = 0:
Except for establishing inequality (28), the remainder of the proof follows as in the previous case.
To establish that P
¤
2d meets (28) it is enough to substitute P in (28) and appeal to assumption A2.
2
Before proving Propositions 3, 4, and 5, it is useful to establish the following
Result. Assume A1-A4 hold. Then the immediate-trading equilibrium is such that m
¤
i 2 (0;1).






then the SR investor is indi®erent about the cash position carried. Let M
¤
i be the solution to




0 (· ¡ M
¤
d);
which by assumption A3 exists and is unique. By assumption A4,
1 ¡ ¸½
1 ¡ ¸















The construction now of the immediate-trading equilibrium follows as in the proof of Proposition 1. 2
We prove Proposition 4 ¯rst. The proof of Proposition 3 following trivially after that.
Proof of Proposition 4. First notice that by the result above, the immediate-trading equilibrium is such
that m
¤
i > 0 (and, obviously, M
¤
i > 0). Thus because the delayed-trading equilibrium specializes to the
immediate-trading equilibrium when µ = 0, it follows that there exists a neighborhood (0;~ µ) such that
m
¤





d are fully determined by
Ã
(M) = ¸ + (1 ¡ ¸)R
¤
d (µ) ¡ '
0 (· ¡ M
¤
d) = 0 (30)
Ã
(m) = (1 ¡ m
¤
d)(1 ¡ ½(¸ + (1¡)µ´)) ¡ (1 ¡ ¸)M
¤
d = 0 (31)
Expression (30) is the LR's ¯rst order condition. Expression (31) is the SR's ¯rst order condition combined




























































m = ¡[1 ¡ ½(¸ + (1 ¡ ¸)µ´)] < 0
Ã
(m)
M = ¡(1 ¡ ¸)
Ã
(M)





µ = ¡(1 ¡ m
¤
d)(1 ¡ ¸)´½ < 0;
First,
j@xÃj = ¡[1 ¡ ½(¸ + (1 ¡ ¸)µ´)]'
00 (· ¡ M
¤
d) > 0








= ¡[ 1 0 ](@xÃ)




























































d is strictly decreasing in µ if m
¤
d = 0 for some b µ, then m
¤
d = 0 for all µ ¸ b µ. For µ ¸ b µ the
LR's ¯rst order condition is given by





0 (· ¡ M
¤
d);
where we have made use of the fact that cash-in-the-market pricing obtains and m
¤
d = 0. Then a basic
application of the implicit function theorem shows that M
¤
d;µ < 0 for µ > b µ. As for the behavior of
expected returns when µ > b µ, notice that the LR's ¯rst order condition is written as
¸ + (1 ¡ ¸)R
¤
d = '
0 (· ¡ M
¤
d);
and thus given that M
¤
d;µ < 0 for µ > b µ, it follows that R
¤
d;µ < 0 for that range.







¡1 (1 ¡ ¸)
2 R
¤
d;µ (1 ¡ µ´)
¡ j@xÃj
¡1'




d)(1 ¡ ¸)´½(1 ¡ µ´) ¡ ´ (1 ¡ m
¤
d) (34)






1 ¡ ½(¸ + (1 ¡ ¸)µ´)

;
which is positive by assumption A2. This completes the proof of Proposition 3. 2








d (µ = 0) and




d. For µ > b µ
M
¤
d is a decreasing function of µ and thus, by continuity there exists a (unique) µ
0, possibly higher than











Proof of Proposition 5. Under assumption A4, m
¤
i > 0 and thus ¼
¤
i = 1 · ¼
¤
d. As for the expected pro¯ts
















d (µ = 0) and the characterization of expected returns in Proposition 3 the result
follows immediately. 2
Proof of Proposition 6. The proof follows along similar lines as that of Proposition 2. First de¯ne P2 to
be the solution to
27




0 (· ¡ (1 ¡ µ)P2);
which always exists, is unique, and immediately implies that P2 < ´½ by assumption A1. De¯ne next
P
fi =
1 ¡ ½[¸ + (1 ¡ ¸)µ´]
(1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ ¸)
;
where fi stands for full information. We have, as before two cases.
² Case 1: P2 < P
fi; then set P
¤
2 = P
fi and set M
¤ to be the unique solution to





0 (· ¡ M
¤); (35)
the LR's ¯rst order condition, which now takes into account the fact that the acquired assets
have expected payo® ´½ as there is no asymmetric information (compare this with the conditional
expected payo® under asymmetric information, expression (14)). Clearly M










(1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ m¤)
;
which, obviously exists, is unique, and satis¯es the SR's ¯rst order condition. SRs and LRs postpone





2 ;µ´½ + (1 ¡ µ)P
¤
2 ]; (36)
which is non-empty by assumption A2. Finally we show that M
¤ > 0. Notice that the LR's ¯rst
order condition (35) can be written as
Ã (µ) = '
0 (· ¡ M
¤) where Ã (µ) = ¸ + (1 ¡ ¸)
2 (1 ¡ µ)´½
1 ¡ ½[¸ + (1 ¡ ¸)µ´]
and notice that again, assumption A3 can be written as Ã (0) > '
0 (·). Di®erentiating, rearranging
and by assumption A2 we obtain that Ãµ > 0, which proves that M
¤ > 0.
² Case 2: P2 ¸ P
fi; then set P
¤




¤ = 0, which by construction satisfy the
LR's and SR's ¯rst order condition, respectively. Notice that given that P
¤
2 · ´½, it immediately
follows that the interval in (36) is non-empty. Finally, to support the equilibrium at date 2 it has
to be the case that ± · ± where ± = P
¤
2 =´½, which concludes the proof. 2
Proof of Proposition 8.
I. Given a choice M of cash carried by LR and ®invested in the SR risky project 0 · ® · 1, the
feasibility constraints on transfers to SR are given by:
C1 (!1½) · ®½ + M;
C1 (!1½) + C3 (!1½) · ®½ + M + '[· + (1 ¡ ®) ¡ M];
C1 (!1L) + C2 (!20) · M;
27Throughout we drop the subscript d to emphasize that now the only equilibrium is a delayed one.
45C1 (!1L) + C2 (!2L) · M;
C1 (!1L) + C2 (!2½) · ®½ + M;
C1 (!1L) + C2 (!2½) + C3 (!2½) · ®½ + M + '[· + (1 ¡ ®) ¡ M];
C1 (!1L) + C2 (!20) + C3 (!20) · M + '[· + (1 ¡ ®) ¡ M];
C1 (!1L) + C2 (!2L) + C3 (!30) · M + '[· + (1 ¡ ®) ¡ M]:
Consider next the following observations concerning equilibrium contracts:
(A) State !1½ is observable and since there is no discounting between periods 1 and 2 we may
assume without any loss of generality that C1(!1½) = C1(!1L) = 0.
(B) If C3(!1½) > 0 then C2(!1½) = ®½+M. For if C2(!1½) < ®½+M , both agents can be made
better o® by increasing C2(!1½) and decreasing C3(!1½):
(C) Incentive compatibility requires that C3(w30) = C3(w3½). Hence any feasible and incentive
compatible payment in histories that follow from !2L is also feasible in histories that follow
!20. Incentive compatibility also requires that
C2 (!2L) + C3 (!30) = C2 (!20) + C3 (!20):
Therefore any payment prescribed for the histories starting at !2L must also be prescribed




(D) If C3(!30) > 0 then C2(!2L) = M: For if C2(!2L) < M SR can be made better o®,
while keeping LR indi®erent, by increasing the payment at date 2 and decreasing by the
same amount the payments in states !30 and !3½ at date 3. The same reason, together with
observation 3, implies that if C3(!20) > 0 then C2(!20) = M. We can also use the same
reasoning to show that if C3(!2½) > 0 then C2(!2½) = M + ®½.
(E) Since (¸ + (1 ¡ ¸))½ > 1 and '
0(·) > 1; if cash is carried by the LR it must be distributed in
some state (at either dates 1 or 2). Hence either C2 (!1½) = M +®½; or C2(!2½) = M +®½ or
C2(!20) = C2(!2L) = M . Note furthermore from observation 4 and incentive compatibility
that we must have C2(!2½) > 0 and C2(!20) > 0 unless SR consumption is zero in all histories
starting at !1L. However, in the latter case, because of discounting and ±Á
0(k) < 1 the ex-ante
contract is dominated by autarky. Hence we may assume that C2(!2½) > 0 and C2(!20) > 0
. In an analogous fashion we can establish that C2(!1½) > 0.





1¡¸ < minfC2(!2½);C2(!20)g. Consider the payment
^ C2 (!1½) = C2 (!1½) + °
and lower date 2 payments for all realizations following !1L by °
¸
1¡¸ . This new contract,
leaves SR indi®erent and economizes in cash. This cash can be invested in the LR project,
46which has a marginal product above one, and yield extra utility for LR at date 3. Hence the
initial contract cannot be optimal.
(G) Suppose that C2(!2L) < M, then from observation 4, C3(!30) = 0. Hence C2(!20) < M
and C2(!2½) < M + ®½. Using the same logic as in observation 6 we may then show that this
contract is not optimal.
(H) Incentive compatibility requires that
C2(!2½) + C3(!2½) = M + C3(!30):
Since C2(!2½) = M satis¯es the LR budget constraint, it follows that
C3(!2½) · C3(!30):
II. Under assumption (A5) LR's opportunity cost of holding cash, '
0(· + (1 ¡ ®) ¡ M), is bounded.
To see this, note ¯rst from lemma 7 that LR must pay SR at least M following the realization of
state !1L. LR's date 0 expected payo® therefore cannot exceed:
´(1 ¡ ¸)®½ + '(· + (1 ¡ ®) ¡ M):
Since participation by LR requires that
´(1 ¡ ¸)®½ + '(· + (1 ¡ ®) ¡ M) ¸ '(·);
we must have · + (1 ¡ ®) ¡ M > 0, by assumption A5. It follows that
'
0(· + (1 ¡ ®) ¡ M) < B; for some B > 0:
Now, suppose by contradiction that C3(!1½) ¸ ² > 0. Then lowering C3(!1½) by ² and increas-
ing M by ±¸² keeps SR indi®erent, but makes LR strictly better o® if B± < 1. Similarly, if
minfC3(!2½);C3(!30)g = C3(!2½) ¸ ²; a decrease of C3(!30) and C3(!2½) by ² and an increase































Figure 1. The risky asset. There are four dates. Investment in the risky asset occurs at
date0. At date 1 there is an aggregate shock. Speci¯cally there are two possible aggregate
states, !1½, which occurs with probability ¸, and !1L, which occurs with probability 1¡¸.
In !1½ the risky asset matures at date 1 and yields a cash dividend ½. !1L is the state
when the long duration asset matures later than date 1 (either at dates 2 or 3). At
date 2, there are three idiosyncratic states of nature, !2½, which occurs with probability
µ´, !20, which occurs with probability µ(1 ¡ ´),and !2L, which occurs with probability
1¡µ. !2½ is the state when the asset matures at date 2 and yields dividend ½. Thus the
probabilities also denote the mass of SRs which are in the corresponding states of nature.
!20 is the state when the asset matures at date 2 but yields no dividends. In !2L the
risky asset is known to mature at date 3. Finally at date 3 there are again two states,
!3½, which occurs with probability ´, and !30, which occurs with probability 1 ¡ ´. In
state !3½ the asset matures at date 3 and yields dividend ½ and in state !30 the asset
matures at date 3 and yields zero dividends. The information set of the LRs at date 2
is denoted by the oval encompassing !20 and !2L, which generates the adverse selection
problem that is key in the analysis. At date 1, agents are symmetrically informed.

























Figure 2. Immediate and delayed-trading equilibria in Example 1 for the case µ = :35.
The graph represents cash holdings, with the cash holdings of the LRs, M, in the x-axis
and the cash holdings of the SRs, m in the y-axis. The dashed curves represent isopro¯t
lines for the LR and the straight continuous lines represent the SR's isopro¯t lines, for
both when the exchange occurs in state !1L and in date 2. The isopro¯t lines for the SR
correspond to its reservation pro¯ts ¼¤
i = ¼¤
d = 1. The immediate and delayed-trading
































Figure 3. Immediate and delayed-trading equilibria in Example 1 when µ = :45. The graph
represents cash holdings, with the cash holdings of the LRs, M, in the x-axis and the
cash holdings of the SRs, m in the y-axis. The dashed curves represent isopro¯t lines for
the LR and the straight continuous lines represent the SR's isopro¯t lines, for both when
the exchange occurs in state !1L and in date 2. As opposed to the case in Figure 2 now
the delayed-treading equilibrium, marked (M¤
d;m¤
d), has the SRs commanding strictly
positive pro¯ts, ¼¤
d > 1. The line marked IPSR denotes the SR's reservation isopro¯t


























Cash position of the LRs in the delayed trading equilibrium as a function of θ
Figure 4. Cash holdings as a function of µ for Example 1. Panel A represents the SR's
cash holdings in the delayed-trading equilibrium, m¤
d as a function of µ and Panel B does
the same for the LR, M¤
d. The dashed vertical line, which sits at b µ = :4196 delimits the
set of µs for which m¤






































Price of the risky asset at t=2 in the delayed trading equilibrium, P
*
2,d
Figure 5. The top panel shows the expected return of the risky asset, R¤
2d, as a function of
µ at date 2 in the delayed-trading equilibrium. The bottom panel shows the price of the
risky asset at t = 2, P¤
2d, as a function of µ at date 2 in the delayed-trading equilibrium.
The dashed vertical line corresponds to b µ = :4196. Both panels correspond to the case






































∗: The expected profit of the LRs in the delayed trading equilibrium
Figure 6. Expected pro¯ts for the SR, ¼¤, (top panel) and the LR (bottom panel), ¦¤, as
a function of µ in the delayed-trading equilibrium for the case considered in Example 1.
The dashed vertical line corresponds to b µ = :4196.













*: The expected profit of the SRs with and without commitment


















Figure 7. Expected pro¯ts for the SR, ¼¤, (top panel) and the LR (bottom panel), ¦¤,
as a function of µ for the case considered in Example 1. The ¯rst dashed vertical line
corresponds to b µ = :4196. The continuous line plots the expected pro¯ts when the Pareto
superior equilibrium is chosen. In regions A and B, the delayed-trading equilibrium
exists and it is the Pareto superior equilibrium. In region C, which corresponds to
µ 2 (:4628;:4834], the delayed-trading equilibrium no longer exists as P¤
d < ±´½ and the
sole equilibrium is the immediate-trading equilibrium. The dashed line corresponds to
the expected pro¯ts when the SRs can commit to liquidate assets in state !2L.











Π: The expected profit of the competitive and the monopolist LR





















Figure 8. Top panel: Expected pro¯ts of the monopolist (the thick line) and the competitive
LR (the thin line) as a function of µ. Bottom panel: Prices at date 2, P¤
2d, in the
monopolist (the thick line) and the competitive (the thin line) LR case. Both panels
correspond to the case considered in Example 1.
















*: The expected profit of the SRs in the delayed trading equilibrium





























Figure 9. Top panel: Expected pro¯ts for the SR in the ex-ante contract when the outside
value is the expected pro¯t associated with the delayed-trading equilibrium. Bottom
panel: Expected pro¯ts of the LR in the ex-ante contract, ¦¤
x, when the outside value of
the SR is the expected pro¯t associated with the delayed-trading equilibrium (¼¤
d). Also
included are the expected pro¯t of the LR in the delayed-trading equilibrium, ¦¤
d, and in
the immediate-trading equilibrium, ¦¤
i. Both panels correspond to the case considered
in Example 2.























Total cash position in the delayed trading equilibrium













Cash position of the LRs in the ex−ante case
Figure 10. Top panel: Total cash position, m¤
d + M¤
d in the delayed-trading equilibrium
as a function of µ. Bottom panel: Cash position of the LR in the ex-ante contract case
as a function of µ when the outside opportunity of the SR is the expected pro¯t in the
delayed-trading equilibrium. Both panels correspond to the case considered in Example
2.
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